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The future forces of the U.S. Army face a great variety of threats with
unprecedented complexities. The American public demands a quick, decisive
victory with minimal casualties. In order to accomplish this, the Army must have
the capability to totally dominate and control the enemy. Requisite Variety is
essential to this mission. This research shows that in order to totally dominate the
battlefield, the variety of options available to the friendly commander must be
greater than or equal to that of the enemy. However, concurrent with the dramatic
changes in the global environment, the U.S. has significantly decreased defense
spending. The competition for these dwindling defense dollars has increased the
Army's risk of misallocating its scarce resources to a few 'brilliant" systems
without regard to the factor of variety. This research provides a conceptual
framework that innovates the Requirements Determination process by utilizing
variety as a factor. It reveals concrete ways to provide the commander with the
necessary variety to dominate the battlefield: through regulation, information, and
variety catalysts. By applying the framework to the concepts of Force XXI
operations, the researcher develops the Time-Information Differential. This
suggests that given the current budgetary constraints, the Army should focus its
short term material acquisitions on C^I and mobility assets. However, to achieve
synergistic results, the Army should concurrently research other types of weapon
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The purpose of this research paper is to develop and examine a conceptual
framework for prioritizing requirements for the future operational forces of the United
States Army. The focus of the framework is on innovating the process of determining
requirements so the Army can remain a superb force, capable of defeating any foe on the
battlefield, subject to the current budgetary constraints and trends of downsizing.
Requisite Variety is essential to this mission, and the Army risks misallocating its scarce
funding to the development of redundant or superfluous weapon systems. Historic
patterns of budgetary feast or famine are likely to return to famine if the Army cannot
articulate the need for variety in addressing immediate needs. The Army's current process
for determining requirements fails to directly assess requisite variety. The potential
consequence of this oversight is that when new threats arise and the need for warfighting
forces increases, the most effective mix of forces will be unavailable. This research paper
provides a framework for utilizing variety as a decision factor in determining requirements.
This is accomplished through a military application of Ross Ashby's theory of Requisite
Variety. The current Requirements Determination process, and conceptual doctrine for
the U.S. Army's Force XXI are examined with particular attention paid to the increased
prevalence of software intensive weapon systems. Using this background information, the
researcher applies the theory of Requisite Variety to develop a conceptual framework for
innovating the requirements determination process. The framework presents guidance for
how much variety is needed, and prioritizes research and development efforts in order to
maximize the Force XXI efforts within budgetary constraints. Finally, the research
analyzes an Advanced Warfighting Experiment with respect to the conceptual framework
and examines the validity of the framework.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
How can the factor of requisite variety be incorporated in the Army requirements
generation process, and how can this factor support process innovation?
2. Secondary Research Questions
a. What is the current process for Requirements Determination and
what pathologies with respect to resource allocation exist with this process?
b. What is the operational concept of land forces for the 21st Century
and how does it impact the structure of forces in the future?
c. What is the theory of Requisite Variety?
d. What are the military applications of the theory of Requisite Variety
and how might it impact the determination of requirements and structuring of forces in the
future?
e. Using the theory of Requisite Variety as a basis, how can a
conceptual framework be developed for innovating the requirements determination
process?
f. What impact would this framework have on Joint warfare and other
Services?
g. What impact would variety have on funding and how can the Army
articulate this to Congress?
C. BACKGROUND
The world has undergone remarkable changes during this decade. During the late
1980's the 'Evil Empire" of communism stilled loomed throughout Eastern Europe and
significantly challenged the security of the United States and other free nations. Today,
the United States no longer faces a single galvanizing threat such as the former Soviet
Union Instead, there is an increased chance of our forces deploying to a number of
limited regional conflicts. This creates a dilemma for our national security and defense
spending. With the completion of the Cold War, the United States significantly decreased
defense spending, but the need for a strong defense posture to meet the increased variety
of limited threats is still valid.
To address this dilemma and define its approach to modernization, the Department
of Defense (DoD) is emphasizing technological supremacy of the battlefield by seizing on
breathtaking advances in information technology, maintaining strong missile defense and
increasing mobility. These elements formed the cornerstone of Operation Desert Storm in
which America showed the world the awesome power of its Information Age Forces.
Smart weapon systems such as stealth aircraft and the PATRIOT missile system allowed
the United States to employ precision strikes and save thousands of lives. The
development of these weapon systems has changed the tactics, techniques and procedures
for the future battlefield. Dominant maneuver, long range precision strikes and real time
awareness across the entire spectrum of the battlefield are concepts which provide the
basis of future doctrine. All of these sensational tactics have a critical commonality:
software. Software-intensive systems provide the technological edge to compete and win
in an ever-changing volatile world environment.
While software gives modern weapon systems enormous capability, operation near
the state-of-the-art often greatly increases cost and risk. DoD has had a distressing history
of procuring elaborate, high-tech software-intensive weapons that do not work, and
cannot be relied upon, modified or maintained. [Ref 27] Additionally, this temptation to
flirt with the edge of the state-of-the-art encourages materiel developers to compete for
scarce resources in search of the "silver bullet" weapon system that can do it all.
Allocation of resources to these high cost systems might create a dangerous, uneven
distribution of funds to a few of these systems which leaves no funds for others. This
tendency to become "lean and mean" by focusing on a few, brilliant weapon systems could
result in disaster, considering the uncertainty of threat that challenges the U.S. today. In
the face of downsizing, shrinking defense spending, and the greater variety in the possible
threats, DoD has to radically change the process of determining requirements and
allocating resources.
Force XXI is the Army's effort to harness the change in world order and advance
into the 21st Century with the most capable land combat force in the world. In order to
make this work, DoD makes some critical assumptions about where to get the money for
these initiatives. One of these assumptions in our defense planning is that significant
savings will be achieved by overhauling our defense acquisition system. This is a system
that has long had a dark cloud hanging over its head: a process that many perceive to be
inefficient, and in light of today's grim procurement budget forecasts, does not work
anywhere near as well as it must.
In an attempt to keep pace with these changes and acquisition reform, the Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has been given the mission by the Chief of
Staff of the U.S. Army to bring discipline to the Requirements Determination Process and
become the 'gatekeeper" for all requirements. TRADOC has proposed new ways to
determine requirements based on desired Joint and Army capabilities as well as
deficiencies deduced from mission area analysis. The concept based portion of this
process involves experiment-based battle labs that take Force XXI operational concepts
coupled with emerging new technologies to conduct warfighting experiments which
become the basis for determining requirements. The problem with this approach is that
each battle lab focuses on a distinct set of operational concepts. This enforces the
competition for scarce resources between the material developers, and does not formally
address the factor of variety in weapon systems and force structure. Instead of bringing
discipline to the process, the new system encourages the tendency for the Army to '£>ut all
their eggs in one basket." In today's uncertain environment, the Army must determine
requirements from a holistic perspective.
The researcher postulates the Army must invest in ways to cope with variety or
have variety in its own force structure. By utilizing variety as a factor, the Army can
maximize the utility of its force despite the conditions that currently face DoD today.
Variety is a key element that provides the capability to achieve synergistic results on the
battlefield. It is also a key factor in dealing with the uncertainty of the future threats that
face the U.S. Variety on the battlefield equates to the possibility of 'doing more" without
the overwhelming number of forces that the U.S. had during the Cold War era. The
problem is that the Army has no framework for evaluating the need for variety or how to
contend with variety in the threat it is facing. The theory of Requisite Variety is an
excellent way to analyze requirements because it provides a way to incorporate the factor
of variety. The theory not only addresses the need for variety, but it also provides a basis
for regulating uncertainty and coping with variety. The theory of Requisite Variety was
postulated in the early 1950's by the British cybertician, Ross Ashby. Ashby studied
techniques to control complex systems. He realized that the more complex a system, the
more difficult it is to understand and control. Ashby discovered that in order to control
the system, the amount of variety in the control mechanism has to be at least as much as in
the system being controlled. The researcher intends to use this theory to develop a
conceptual framework for determining requirements that incorporates the factor of
variety.
D. SCOPE
This research addresses the future force structure of the U.S. Army subject to
current budget constraints. Specifically, it analyzes the current requirements
determination process and conceptual doctrine for the future of the Army with respect to
the uncertain threat from the world environment. The research examines a way to
innovate the current process using the theory of Requisite Variety as a basis. It includes a
literature review of the current requirements determination process and the major themes
of conceptual doctrine with the assumption that the reader has a basic knowledge of the
overall acquisition process and current doctrine for the U.S. Army. No classified material
will be addressed. While the research focuses primarily on the Army's process of
requirements determination, by the very nature of joint warfare, this study should be
relevant to all Services of DoD. The study examines the theory of Requisite Variety and
develops a conceptual framework for its application. The conceptual framework is
examined with respect to an Advanced Warfighting Experiment conducted at Fort Knox,
KY
E. METHODOLOGY
The first objective of this research paper is to provide an overview of the current
Requirements Generation process and future warfighting concepts developed by the Army
to take the force into the 21st Century. This is accomplished through a literature review
of sources including periodicals, books, reports, DoD documents, and U.S. Army
manuals. These materials were obtained from the Defense Technical Informational
Center, the Defense Logistics Systems Information Exchange, and the Naval Postgraduate
School Library. Additional information was obtained by exploring the Internet and the
new Acquisition Deskbook for the most current publications and articles. Analysis of the
current process identifies what pathologies exist with respect to providing variety in our
future forces.
The next objective is to investigate whether or not the theory of Requisite Variety
can be applied to innovate the Requirements Determination process. This is accomplished
through an analysis and military application of the theory with respect to future
operational concepts. The researcher uses the background information to develop a
framework to innovate the process using variety as a factor.
The final objective is to examine the validity of the framework and see what impact
it has on the Army and other Services. This is accomplished by observing and analyzing
results of experiments conducted by the Advanced Warfighting Work Group and the
Mounted Battlespace Battle Lab located at Fort Knox, KY. These organizations have
been on the cutting edge of Force XXI concepts for the last five years and the researcher
has worked with them in previous assignments. The choice of this method of research























Figure 1-1. Road Map to the Study
Figure 1 - 1 orients the reader to the flow of this study. Chapter II provides an
overview of the current Requirements Determination Process developed by TRADOC.
The process is designed to discipline the system, identify requirements faster, improve
products, and shorten acquisition time. An analysis of the process with respect to variety
identifies what pathologies exist. The chapter concludes by examining how future
operational concepts are integrated into the process.
Chapter III identifies and discusses future operational concepts for land combat in
the 21st Century. The chapter examines the revolution in military affairs that is being
driven by information age technologies. The major thrust of this chapter is to explicate the
intentions of these key concepts, and lay the groundwork for the discussion of requisite
variety
Chapter IV examines the theory of Requisite Variety. This is a theory that was
derived from the study of cybernetics on how to control systems. The researcher gives
basic examples of the theory, along with a military application of its underlying concept.
Chapter V analyzes the results of the research to determine if the theory of
Requisite Variety has any applicability to the study. It provides a framework for
innovating the process of Requirements Determination. The framework presents guidance
for how much variety is needed, and prioritizes research and development efforts in order
to maximize the Force XXI efforts within budgetary constraints. The researcher identifies
what implications the theory has on the Requirements Determination process and
structuring of forces in the 21st Century. The chapter concludes with a discussion on how
these innovations affect acquisition reform.
Chapter VI presents the data that were observed from experiments conducted by
the Advanced Warfighting Workgroup and Mounted Battlespace Battle Lab at Fort Knox,
KY. The researcher analyzes the experiments with respect to the framework presented in
the previous chapter. The researcher analyzes the validity of the framework and explores
other possible uses of the framework.
Chapter VII presents a clear and concise summary of the conclusions that can be
logically drawn from the research. The researcher makes recommendations for action and
proposes an implementation plan for the framework. Additionally, the chapter presents
recommendations for Areas for Further Research
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY
This study presents a radically different paradigm for innovating the process of
moving the Army into the 21st Century. The current process relies on the development of
costly high-tech weapon systems that obviate the need to put "boots on the ground"
through a variety of sources. Indeed, a Utopian desire is to create a bloodless battlefield
through the use of such weapon systems. However, in today's budgetary constrained and
uncertain threat environment, this desire is laudable but naive. A better approach is to
address the factor of variety and use it to provide a framework for structuring future
forces.
This research effort should benefit DoD organizations that are involved in the
process of acquisition reform and structuring of forces for the 21st Century. In this period
of shrinking defense spending, all Services need a process for prioritizing future
operational needs, and more importantly the Services have to be able to intelligently
articulate these needs to the organization that holds the 'power of the purse," Congress.
The military interpretation of the theory of Requisite Variety as applied to Force XXI will
provide a common vocabulary from which 'warfighters" and officials from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) may discuss the requirements determination of future
forces. The study will specifically benefit TRADOC by providing insights to innovations in
acquisition reform. In general, the study will provide a new paradigm for defending
budget requests for the Armed Forces. Finally, the problem of developing a strong force
in the future while maintaining the current operational level of the current force will be
addressed.
The researcher does not believe that he will discover anything entirely new. What
will be new is the degree to which the study extends existing concepts and recombines
them with extensions of other concepts such as Ashby's theory of Requisite Variety. The
study will create a new paradigm, based on existing building blocks, but essentially a new
system with new internal dynamics. To properly examine and integrate new digital
warfighting concepts with acquisition reform, DoD must have a framework and a
vocabulary for intellectually examining the future battlefield. This study results from the
researcher's efforts toward this objective.
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n. REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the Army's requirements determination process. The first
section provides an overview from DoD's perspective. Following this macro level
overview is a more detailed look at the Army's process. This is a new multifaceted
experiential process that has evolved from the concept based system. Key elements of the
process are identified and discussed. The final section analyzes the process with respect to
variety, and identifies what pathologies exist.
B. PROCESS OVERVIEW
The method DoD uses to determine requirements is a deductive process that
begins with the development of a National Security Strategy. Considering this strategy,
the Services conduct a Mission Area Assessment and Mission Needs Assessment to
determine what deficiencies exist that will keep them from accomplishing their respective
missions. [Ref. 8: par. 6(a)] Guidance and policies for defining requirements place
emphasis on translating operational needs into stable, affordable programs. [Ref. 12: par.
D. 1] Therefore, the first choice in resolving deficiencies is to change doctrine, tactics, or
training. These nonmateriel alternatives are investigated first because of their relatively
low cost and ease (i.e., speed) of implementation. Should nonmateriel alternatives prove
incapable of resolving the deficiency, then materiel solutions are identified. The
regulations specify two documents to describe requirements, the mission need statement
(MNS) and the operational requirements document (ORD). [Ref. 13: part 2] The MNS
is generated first and describes requirements in broad operational, not system specific,
terms. Once alternatives to satisfy the mission need are studied and a system concept
selected, an ORD is prepared to describe the system solution. The overall requirements































Figure 2-1. Mission Need Determination
It is noteworthy, that this process is not only based on threat and deficiencies, but
also on opportunities for new capabilities. The US Army has fully adopted this
Capabilities Based Requirements Determination System (CBRS). TRADOC is currently
revising its requirements determination regulations to build upon the CBRS. One of these
new Army Regulations (AR) that has come out in draft format is AR 71-9, Force
Development Requirements
.
This document is a major revision of the previous AR 71-9
that was last updated in February 1987. Another important document is a TRADOC
pamphlet that is entitled Requirements Determination . This TRADOC pamphlet is the
third in a series of four pamphlets that TRADOC has issued in their 'Black Book" format.
Elements of the 'Black Book" and the new AR 71-9 will be discussed in the following
paragraphs.
Army Regulation (AR) 71-9 (Draft) defines requirements determination as:
...the process of identifying and analyzing warflghting required future
operational capabilities (FOCs) for doctrine, training, leader development,
12
organizations, and soldier development and executing solutions, within the
context of the force development process. [Ref. 10: par. l-4(b)]
The 'Black Book," published in March of 1996, documents the impact that future
warfighting concepts and advanced technologies have on requirements determination.
The requirements determination process begins with a holistic future
warfighting concept. The concept is influenced, but not driven, by an
appreciation of future science and technology (S&T)
possibilities...Warfighting concepts also document Army goals for the
S&T communities. The goals are broadly descriptive in nature so as to
provide sufficient leeway to examine experimental discoveries. [Ref. 31:
P- 5]
From these statements it is clear that the Army is placing great importance on
CBRS and future technology opportunities. The goal of this approach is to speed up the
requirements determination process while at the same time improving its product. [Ref.
22: p. 26] To accomplish this goal, TRADOC has outlined five key elements that
describe how the future warfighting concept focuses S&T research and warfighting
experiments and leads to defined requirements.
C. ELEMENTS OF THE REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROCESS
1. Concept Development
The terms 'Vision," 'concept" and 'doctrine" are not synonymous, and are often
misunderstood. The Army describes a 'Vision" as a rudimentary abstract description of a
desired end state. A 'concept" is a translation of a vision or visions into a more detailed,
but still abstract description of some future activity or endstate. 'Doctrine" is described as
a body of thoughts that are the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their
actions in support of objectives. Visions and concepts generate questions about the
future, while doctrine provides answers about today. [Ref. 31: p. 8]
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The TRADOC commander develops the Army's future warfighting vision. He
develops this vision with input from national security and military strategy, and also from
current and future scientific and technological opportunities. The TRADOC Deputy Chief
of Staff for Combat Developments (DCDSD) heads up an Integrated Concept Team (ICT)
which translates the TRADOC commander's warfighting vision into an overarching
warfighting concept. This overarching warfighting concept becomes the primary reference
for all other concept development activities. [Ref. 31: p. 8-9]
More detailed operational and functional concepts are developed by TRADOC
school commandants through their Directorates of Combat Developments (DCDs). The
school commandants form their own ICTs to produce these concepts. All concepts
developed by school commandants must be approved by the TRADOC commander.
Concept development usually leads to further scientific and technological research or
experiments. During this concept development analysis, requirements and other
interesting ideas emerge. These ideas and requirements must support future warfighting
concepts.
2. Future Operational Capabilities
Future Operational Capabilities (FOCs) were previously known as Operational
Capability Requirements (OCRs). FOCs are intended to provide a warfighting focus for
the Army's Science and Technology investments. One set of FOCs is written for each
Battle Lab and encompasses the battlefield dynamic for which the Battle Lab is
responsible. They are employed during warfighting experiments to assess the value of
Science and Technology (S&T) endeavors and to translate concepts into discrete,
statements of need. An example of a FOC for the Battle Command Systems Battle Lab as
written in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66 is:
BC01: Battlefield Information Control: To fulfill the vision articulated
in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations , and the Battle
Command Concept, the battle command system must have the capability to
collect, process and disseminate in real- and near real-time information on
14
the friendly and enemy situation, command directives, and other essential
information. [Ref. 30: p. 4]
3. Science and Technology
The Army Science and Technology (S&T) program is designed to develop
innovative technological warfighting concepts. All sources of new technology such as
Commercial Items (CI), and non-developmental items (NDI) as well as new-start
programs are analyzed. These all assist in achieving the goal of rapid requirements
determination. For example, if a CI or NDI item produces a Future Operational
Capability, then we save the expense and time spent for research that is required by a
new-start. [Ref. 31: p. 10] Research into new possibilities is not unguided, but is focused
by a series of reviews. Annually, the Army assesses all proposed S&T projects. From this
assessment, a list of the top 200 Army S&T Objectives (STO) is generated. The Army
Science and Technology Working Group (ASTWG) approves each STO, and the
approved STO is listed in the Army Science and Technology Master Plan (ASTMP). The
ASTMP provides the basis for Advance Technology Demonstrations which are analyzed
to determine if any have military merit. [Ref. 31: p. 1 1 ]
4. Warfighting Experiments
Warfighting experiments are described as the 'heart" of the requirements
determination process. They are designed to provide Army leaders with future operational
capability insights. Warfighting experiments are different from test and evaluation as they
are designed to gain understanding about future warfighting, not just to measure an
existing system, or new procedures.
Battle labs are responsible for planning and conducting warfighting experiments.
The battle lab must first develop a hypothesis and then prepare detailed plans that describe
objectives, measures of performance, measures of effectiveness, participants, milestones,
data collection and resources. They are assisted by the TRADOC Analysis Center
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(TRAC) which leads the analysis of every experiment. Their analysis and
recommendations form the basis for the final experiment report. The experiment report
yields insights through which the battle labs can make recommendations to invest in the
concept, discard the concept, or experiment further with the concept
There are two main categories of warfighting experiments. They are concept
experiments, and advanced warfighting experiments (AWE). Most of the experiments are
concept experiments. These pertain to individual operations or branches of the Army such
as Air Defense, Infantry, or Armor. [Ref 31: p. 12-13]
Larger experiments that focus on advancements to warfighting capabilities across
multiple branches are part of the AWE program. AWE programs are sponsored by the
TRADOC commander with the Chief of Staff, Army, approving and resourcing the
experiment. Both types of experiments involve field soldiers and units in a field
environment. As these experiments are expensive, attempts are being made to increase the
amount of simulation involved. Interactive simulators and modeling are ways to reduce
the cost and length of large experiments with actual soldiers.
5. Integrated Concept Teams (ICTs)
While the warfighting experiments are the "heart" of this requirements
determination process, ICTs are the catalyst that make things happen. AR 71-9 (Draft)
defines ICTs as "multidisciplinary teams formed throughout the Army representing
appropriate Major Army Commands (MACOMs) and staffs, appropriate DoD
organizations other Federal agencies, industry, and academia." [Ref. 10: par. l-4(c)]
The range of possible participants specified in the regulation includes personnel from the
office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) to personnel from
the office of The Surgeon General The intention of this methodology is to allow concepts
to be looked at from many perspectives and solidify requirements more quickly. The ICTs
"brainstorm" concepts from both visionary and practical perspectives with the goal of
shortening the requirements determination "event" by providing it better early focus. This
"brainstorming" is not constrained by costs as concepts are being explored, but potential
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cost data are gathered so that they can be used as a baseline later in the process. The S&T
community and industry participate to provide awareness of state-of-the-art technology
and to preclude the pursuit of "dead end" requirements.
The ICT complements the existing Integrated Product Team (IPT) methodology
used by materiel developers to manage system development. IPT methodology is
discussed in detail in DoD Regulation 5000.2R. Formation of the ICT in the early concept
development enables the team to transition to an IPT when a materiel solution is deemed
necessary to satisfy a warfighting FOC. [Ref. 10: par. l-2(b)] Thus, continuity is
maintained from concept to fielding for a materiel solution.
D. SUMMARY OF THE PROCESS
This section describes the Army's process for determining requirements. Figure 2-
2 below depicts this process.
Figure 2-2. Army's Capabilities Based Requirements Determination
To summarize, the process begins with the TRADOC commander's vision which is
then translated into FOCs. Then ICTs take these concepts and further define them into
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capabilities and solutions. These capabilities are tested through a combination of live,
constructive, and virtual experiments. Feedback from these experiments is used to refine
the ideas and concepts and eventually develop requirements.
This process is designed to be flexible. It has multiple entry and exit opportunities
and is easily tailored to support different types and levels of requirements. The ICTs are
intended to provide thorough, concurrent consideration of desired warfighting capabilities
and the means to achieve these capabilities. The Army feels this methodology will "enable
leaders to make better and faster decisions." [Ref 31: p. 6]
An initial analysis suggests that this process does give the Army a wide variety of
perspectives from which to 'brainstorm" concepts. This increases the amount of options
from which to meet requirements. The Army will be more aware from the perspective of
both the technological and conceptual opportunities. Utilizing a variety of perspectives
during concept formulation, however, does not directly translate into requisite variety in
the operational forces. Nowhere in the process does the Army evaluate or access the
necessity and importance of variety. The ORD does 'fckirt the edges" of this factor by
addressing the Threat and Shortcoming of Existing Systems in paragraphs two and three,
respectively. However, in this Post Cold War era, the threat is highly uncertain and
addressing shortcomings of existing systems appears to act as a constraint in order to
reduce duplication of effort. While on the surface, this approach may seem noble and
frugal, the consequence of not directly addressing variety may be costly. Adding to the
difficulty, these costs are hard to quantify without a framework for measuring variety.
Instead of indirectly constraining variety, the Army should have some method for directly
evaluating this factor in its decision-making process. Additionally, the current process is
based on the FOCs which are assigned to different Battle Labs. Each Battle Lab
concentrates on their specific set of FOCs. The researcher feels that this stovepipe
process coupled with shrinking Defense dollars fosters a competitive environment in which
each Battle Lab fights hard for funding of their specific projects. This in turn, impedes the
amount of variation in our forces. In this context, there is a need to have a framework for
conducting cost/benefit analysis of variety. Rather than merely analyzing the costs and
benefits of variety, however, perhaps a more important question to answer is:
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Given that the currentfiscal environment constrains the amount of
variety in ourforces, how can the Army prioritize weapon systems in order
to mitigate this deficiency?
It is logical to presume that TRADOC considers the factor of variety. TRADOC
has included this factor in its most recent version of its keystone doctrine Field Manual
(FM) 100-5, Operations
.
In fact, this manual includes a discussion of variety as part of
one of the five tenants of Army Operations, Versatility.
Versatility is the ability of units to meet diverse mission
requirements... Versatility requires competence in a variety of missions
and skills... Versatility ensures that units can conduct many different
kinds of operations, either sequentially or simultaneously, with the same
degree of success. [Ref. 11: p. 2-9]
It is interesting that the Army ranks variety (i.e., versatility) important enough to
make it a tenet of Army Operations in the keystone doctrine manual, yet fails to address
variety when determining requirements. The researcher postulates that the Army does not
directly address variety in this respect, because variety is too hard to quantify and
articulate. The Army lacks a sufficient framework to accomplish these tasks.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter examined the Army's current requirements determination process.
The process begins with a holistic future warfighting concept. This concept is formed
from a wide variety of inputs, including the national security and military strategies,
lessons learned from recent operational experiences and future conflict scenarios, and
future S&T possibilities. This overarching concept is the basis for operations and
functional concepts addressing the full spectrum of Army operations and functions.
Together, the warfighting concepts are the Army's "blueprint" for determining
requirements. By design, the process is very flexible. It accommodates spiral
development and employs a variety of feedback mechanisms. However, there are some
pathologies that exist with the process. Namely, the process does not directly address the
importance of variety in the composition of forces. It does not assess or evaluate the need
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for having a variety of weapon systems. Perhaps more important in today's environment
of tight fiscal constraints, the process does not have the capability to prioritize weapon
systems with respect to variety. The researcher will address these pathologies in chapters
four and five of this study. First, it is important to understand some of the basic doctrinal
concepts of Force XXI, because all materiel acquisition programs must be based on
identified FOCs. The next chapter discusses the basic concepts and lays the groundwork
for developing a framework for requisite variety.
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III. FORCE XXI OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
A. INTRODUCTION
As covered in the last chapter, material acquisition programs must be based on
identified FOCs. These FOCs are generated as a direct result of continuing assessments of
current and projected capabilities in the context of changing national military strategy and
national defense policy. FOCs must first be evaluated to determine if they can be satisfied
by nonmateriel solutions. Nonmateriel solutions include changes in doctrine, training,
leader development, organizational issues or soldier issues. Only when a need cannot be
met by such changes will a materiel solution, expressed in terms of a non-system specific,
required operational capability be developed. It is important to note that the requirements
determination process is not a support mechanism for a particular system or piece of
equipment. Rather, it is a process that supports a holistic view of the Army's warfighting
requirements Determining how and why the Army fights is critical to this process. It is
only from this determination that future warfighting operational capabilities can be validly
identified. Thus we see that there is a dynamic tension between doctrinal concepts and
materiel developments; they shape one another.
This chapter examines the Army's concepts for land combat in the 21st Century.
It begins with an overview of the threat and future strategic environment that face the U.S.
Army. Next, it outlines the recent history of doctrine and concept development. With this
as a background, the characteristics and patterns of Force XXI operations are examined.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of how these concepts impact the future
organizational and materiel requirements.
B. THREATS AND FUTURE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
Rather than a single, focused threat, America's twenty-first century Army
faces a broad range of challenges. [Ref 25]
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While FM 100-5 is the cornerstone doctrinal manual for Army operations, it is
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, FORCE XXI OPERATIONS , that drives the concepts for
future forces. It represents the baseline in the formulation of more definitive follow-on
concepts for early twenty-first century Army operations. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 is not
doctrine, rather a document of ideas. These ideas are expressed in a coherent concept that
incorporates commander's vision and leads to FOCs. These FOCs are examined during
Army Warfighting Experiments which lead to discovery of needed changes in
requirements. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 is a 'Working document" subject to continuous
improvement. As concepts become more definitized, they become the basis for doctrine.
The most recent edition of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 was published in August of 1994.
The next section of this study outlines the future trends and characteristics of future
armies that are described in this Pamphlet.
1. Trends -- Elements of Instability
Following the end of the Cold War the world experienced many changes. This
period of great transition created tension between nations and subnations on a variety of
issues: economic, technical, societal, religious, cultural, and physical. While the end of
the Cold War served as a catalyst for these changes, many scholars argue that the world
would be caught up in revolutionary upheaval today even if the Berlin Wall had not fallen
and the Soviet Union still existed. As Alvin and Heidi Toffler argue in their book, War
and Anti-War
. 'We are witnessing...the sudden eruption of a new civilization on the
planet, carrying with it a knowledge-intensive way of creating wealth that is trisecting and
transforming the entire global system today." [Ref 28: p. 242] There are many
indicators that suggest this dramatic restructuring of the world's geopolitical framework
will continue.
For the past three centuries the nation-state has been the basic unit of the global
system. However, this building block for world order is changing. 'The startling fact is
that of all the present members of the United Nations roughly a third are now threatened
by significant rebel movements, dissidents, or governments-in-exile." [Ref. 28: p. 242]
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Although nation-states will continue to be the world's primary political unit, they are
under attack in much of the world. Major powers face the temptation to intervene as the
shifting and unstable power balances at the national and subnational levels threaten to
engage their vital interests.
Nationalism has replaced communist ideology as the leading cause of interstate and
intrastate conflict. Nationalist movements are based on many sources of mass identity:
religious, tribal, ethnic, historical, or territorial, are supplanting older, ideologically based
identities. These movements can erode the power and legitimacy of states. As regimes
that have kept foreign political forms come under attack by these groups seeking to
establish or reestablish their identity, instability ensues. This instability threatens not only
Western interests within the state but often threatens to spill across borders. [Ref. 29: p.
2-1] The former Secretary of State Warren Christopher warned the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that 'if we don't find some way that the different ethnic groups can
live together in a country...we '11 have 5,000 countries rather than the hundred-plus we
now have." [Ref 28: p. 242]
The relevance of the conventional balance of power theory is questionable. This is
particularly evident in the area of economics. Advances in production and marketing
techniques have widened the gap between rich and poor states, yet national markets are
becoming less important than local, regional, and global markets. For instance, it is nearly
impossible to tell what country a particular car or computer comes from, since its parts
and software come from many different sources. Questions of access to, or control of,
strategic resources, lines of communications, and markets are likely to lead to conflict.
The temptation to use military force to rectify perceived economic imbalances will be
great.
Population growth, particularly in the less-developed world, will strain the
resources and social structures of the states affected. Because much of the world's
population growth occurs in areas prone to natural disasters and famine, such events can
cause mass migrations of refugees. [Ref. 29: p. 2-2]
The ability of a government to govern effectively is being eroded in much of the
world. Throughout the world, governments are less able to provide economic stability
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and security for their populace. Even the most powerful governments and their central
banks are having trouble controlling their own currency in light of the unregulated tidal
waves of electronic money. Capitalism and the collapse of dictated economies are
creating problems of distribution and structural unemployment. Immature government
infrastructures in developing democracies cause expectations to be unmet and groups to
turn to other outlets for hope, often leading to conflict. With this eroding security comes
a rise in ungoverned groups or criminal organizations. When combined with nationalist
groups, criminal groups have the potential to supplement, or even supplant, the state.
Rapid improvements in technology are disrupting established ways of doing
business. Information technology is allowing businesses to reduce middle management
and support staffs. Aside from the vast increase in unemployment worldwide, technology
improvements enable companies and states to leapfrog some technologies. American
technical superiority cannot be guaranteed. As in the past, a revolutionary advance in
technology could result in reordering of economic or military power. [Ref. 29: p. 2-3]
Rapid advances will continue to be made in the way nations collect, communicate,
and use information. The proliferation of microprocessing technology causes the 'block-
speed" of public awareness to accelerate. Manipulation of the media to control public
opinion can be practiced by all states and nations. This acceleration means that hot-spots
and wars can materialize almost overnight in the homes of millions via news networks
such as CNN. Dramatic events demand response before governments have had time to
digest their significance. Politicians are compelled to make more and more decisions
about things they know less and less about at a faster and faster rate.
All of these trends suggest that the world will continue its dramatic transition
towards a complex new global system made up of regions, religions, nongovernmental
organizations, and political movements. All of these have different interests and reflect
different degrees of interactivity. Whether or not this was caused by the end of the Cold
War is left for the scholars to debate. For the purposes of this study, these trends of
instability indicate that the U.S. will face challenges of unprecedented complexity,
diversity, and scope as we move into the 21st Century.
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2. Characteristics of Future Armies
The Cold War paradigm of threat analysis is insufficient to capture the full
spectrum of military capabilities that future threats may display. Consequently, TRADOC
Pamphlet 525-5 developed a new model that attempts to capture the wide variety of
threats that could face the U.S. The threat spectrum model shown in Figure 3-1 arrays
























Figure 3-1. Future Threat Spectrum
a. Phenomenological Threats
Nonmilitary threats resulting from human occurrences, experiences and
natural emergencies may require a military response. These phenomena can include




Nonnation security threats, using modern technologies that give them some
capabilities similar to nation-states, are becoming increasingly visible. The nonnation
forces present unique problems to the professional armies, particularly in terms of ethics
and intelligence. They do not fight by the rules of conventional warfare. Their targets are
not force-oriented but are the political will of the opponent. Their tactics include
ambushes, terrorism, kidnapping, and criminal actions. The nonnational forces can be
differentiated by their scope.
• Subnational threats include the political, racial, religious, cultural, ethnic
conflicts that challenge the defining features and authority of the nation-state from within.
• Anational threats operate without regard to the authority of their nation-states.
These entities are not part of the nation-state and have no desire to establish such a status.
Regional organized crime, piracy, and terrorist activities comprise these threats.
• Metanational threats move beyond the nation-state, operating on an
interregional or global scale. They include religious movements, international criminal
organizations, and informal economic organizations that facilitate weapons proliferation.
One can see many examples of nonnational threats just from watching the
news. Groups like the IRA, KKK, Neo-Nazi skinheads, and international drug cartels are
but a few of these threats that exist today.
c. Internal Security Forces
In most cases, these are the small, poorly trained and equipped forces of
the less-developed world, that can maintain order within a country but would have
difficulty defending its borders or conducting extended military operations. The forces in
Somalia and Haiti are good examples of recent internal security forces. As with the




Most of the less-developed world armies have some armor but are reliant
upon dismounted infantry for the bulk of their force. Examples are the army of
Afghanistan who faced the Soviet Union in the 1980s, and the Bosnian and Serbian armies
of today. The skill of these armies to integrate high tech weaponry and conduct combined
operations are marginal or basic (tactical on the horizontal axis of the threat spectrum).
e. Armor-Mechanized-Based Armies
Armies of most industrial nations fall into this category. Armored units
generally comprise 40 percent of their forces. Their ability to integrate weapons and
conduct combined operations vary. There are two major trends that run throughout these
types of armies. First, they develop or procure weapon systems to match or defeat those
of their neighbors. Second, they tend to have hierarchical Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence (C-^I) structures. These armies are not as
technologically advanced as complex, adaptive armies, but they compensate with numbers
and weight of metal. Examples are the armies of Iraq and Iran.
/ Complex, Adaptive Armies
These most technically and tactically advanced armies come from
developed nations. They will be smaller and increasingly more expensive to equip and
maintain. Their complex forces give them greater flexibility to seize the initiative on the
battlefield across the entire spectrum of situations. Future operations will involve
increasingly high-tech equipment, joint/multinational forces, multidimensional maneuver,
precision munitions, smart weapons platforms, and enhanced situational awareness.
However, the multiplication of specialized units that allows flexibility also adds to their
vulnerabilities. Threats from weapons of mass destruction and disruption of their key
support elements can eliminate the 'edge" these armies have over the less-advanced force.
[Ref. 29]
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g. The Impact ofProliferation and Modernization
An examination of the Threat Spectrum Model shows that there are a great
variety of threats that will face our nation in the future. The most serious challenge to
U.S. military superiority, however, will not come from any one state or group but from a
process: the proliferation of weapons and technology. During the Cold War, efforts at
preventing the spread of mass-destructive weapons were based on ten key assumptions:
[Ref 28: pp. 199-200]
1
.
The new weapons could be monopolized by a few strong nations.
2. Nations seeking such arms would have to produce their own.
3. Small nations, in general, lacked the necessary resources.
4. Only a few weapons or types would meet the definition or weapons of
mass destruction.
5. These weapons depend on a handful of raw materials that were
monitorable and controllable.
6. They also depended on a few specific, identifiable technologies whose
spread could also be watched and controlled.
7. The actual number of "secrets" needed to prevent proliferation would
also be small in number.
8. Regulatory agencies could collect and disseminate information for use
by the world nuclear industry without revealing knowledge that would
help arms proliferators.
9. Existing nations would remain stable and not break apart.
10. Nation-states were the only possible proliferators.
Today, every one of these assumptions is demonstrably false. Threat
forces of all variety will take lessons learned from the Gulf War and try to improve their
armed forces relatively quickly. If they do not have the fiscal capability to procure new
state-of-the-art systems, they will upgrade existing systems through strap-on technologies.
The access to technology, however, does not equal force modernization. Although a
nation can leapfrog technologies (e.g., space, nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles),
improving integrative capability is more difficult. Those states that can fully integrate
these weapon systems into all aspects of operations will achieve innovative results. This is
similar to the concept of Soviet origin called Military Technical Revolution.
A Military Technical Revolution occurs when the application of new
technologies into military systems combines with innovative operational
concepts or organizational adaptation to alter fundamentally the character
and conduct of military operations. This produces a dramatic improvement
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in military effectiveness and combat potential. What is revolutionary is not
the speed with which the change takes place, but rather the magnitude of
the change itself. Mere technological improvements do not constitute a
Military Technical Revolution. In 1940, tanks, improved aircraft designs,
and radios were available to both the French and the Germans. However,
it was the Germans who adapted their organizations, procedures, and
tactics to transform the trench warfare of World War I into the blitzkrieg.
[Ref. 29: p. 2-8]
The Threat Spectrum Model described above successfully captures the multitude
of diverse threats that might face the U.S. It certainly is more germane to the discussion
of future operations than the antiquated Cold War paradigm of threat analysis. When
coupled with the ongoing trends of instability, this immense variety of possible threats
begins to provide a basis which suggests that U.S. forces must be more versatile than in
the past. They still have the mission to fight and win the nation's wars. Yet, they must be
able to transition from this state of readiness to conduct other operations then quickly
transition back, perhaps in the same theater of operations. In order to postulate what is
required to meet these challenges it is useful to examine what has been done in the past.
C. RECENT HISTORY OF DOCTRINE
"Doctrine is the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions
in support of national objectives." [Ref. 29: p. G-3] It is authoritative in nature but
requires judgment in application. Doctrine provides the general rules that guide actions on
the battlefield. It includes tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) which steer the
operations of individual soldiers and units. Doctrine has evolved quite dramatically over
the last twenty-five years. In the early 1970s the U.S. had a relatively prescriptive Cold
War strategy related to a single, focused threat. The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 highlighted
an impressive Soviet operational doctrine and the realities of the Warsaw Pact. To
counter these, TRADOC developed the Active Defense in the 1976 edition ofFM 100-5.
[Ref. 24] It reflected a U.S. force outnumbered and a force on the way to being
technically inferior qualitatively on an armor-dominated European battlefield.
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Over time, TRADOC reevaluated this doctrine with respect to the offensive
firepower that technological weapon systems such as missiles, attack helicopters, and
fighter jets brought to the battlefield. The 1982 and 1986 editions of FM 100-5
introduced and solidified the concept of AirLand Battle. This doctrine still reflected U.S.
forces being outnumbered on the battlefield but no longer technically inferior because of
procurement of these new systems. AirLand Battle was characterized by the
synchronization of airpower and ground forces throughout a framework that delineated
the close, deep, and rear battlefield that suited Central Europe. It emphasized a balance of
the offense and defense, and controlled tempo of operations based on the echeloned attack
of Soviet or Soviet-style forces. 'AirLand Battle used a relatively prescriptive, fixed
framework to focus combat power and it worked." [Ref 29: p. 3-17] It was the
foundation of the Army's successful 100-hour ground war in Operation Desert Storm in
1991.
As the troops returned home from Desert Storm, the nation entered into a radically
different era. Unlike the relatively predictable environment of the Cold War, the U.S.
faced the great uncertainty of a world marked by rapidly accelerating changes.
Historically, there have been five categories that indicate that it is time to adjust to a
changing environment: threats and unknown dangers, national military strategy, history
and lessons learned, the changing nature of warfare and technology (See Figure 3-2).
Usually, only a few of these indicators are present. However, in the early 1990s all
five indicators existed, suggesting that the world was entering a revolutionary era.
General Fredrick M. Franks, the Commander of TRADOC at the time, described this
phenomenon in an article he wrote in 1 993
.
At times there may have been only one indicator, dimly lit. At other times,
maybe two or three were glowing with some intensity. But today, and for
the last few years, all of them have been burning brightly to announce that
not only are we in a period requiring some significant change, but perhaps
that we, too, are entering an entirely new era — a period requiring some
bold adjustments in how we think about warfare, warfighting and the












Source: [Ref. 15: p. 5]
Figure 3-2. Indicators of Change
During the early 1990s the nation was facing a multitude of new threats and
unknown dangers in an environment of proliferating warfighting technologies such as
weapons of mass destruction. The public and national values demanded a change in
national strategy which emphasized force projection and quick, decisive victories with
minimal casualties. The availability of CIs and technological systems fueled the rapidly
changing nature of warfare. Systems that were proven in Desert Storm, such as Global
Positioning Systems (GPS) and satellite information, gave commanders on the battlefield
unprecedented capabilities. All of these factors indicated that national military strategy
needed dramatic changes.
As the strategy evolved from the prescriptive nature of the Cold War era, so did
doctrine. In 1993, TRADOC published the current edition of FM 100-5 that contained
significant changes. Reflecting the multipolar world, recent combat, and technological
advances, doctrine was developed for a force-projection Army. Army operations
expanded into wider joint and combined integration and also included Operations Other
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Than War (OOTW). This capabilities-and-principles based doctrine described how to
think about operations with a variety of possible battlespace frameworks, to include
simultaneous rather than sequential deep and close operations. (The concept of
battlespace will be explained in the next section) It also reflected the blurring of levels of
war, the beginnings of information operations, and the mix of war and OOTW in the same
theater. [Ref. 1 1 ] This introduced full-dimensional operations and served as the basis for
many of concepts of Force XXI operations that are described in the next section of this
chapter.
D. CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCE XXI OPERATIONS
The next evolution of doctrine will expand the 1993 evolution of full-dimensional
operations into Force XXI operations. Reflecting advances in weapons and information
technology, full-dimensional operations achieve force coherence through shared
knowledge. With a shared common and timely perception of the battlefield, commanders
can use a relatively unconstrained framework to organize and control the tempo of
operations. These operations have the following general characteristics: multi-
dimensional, precise, non-linear, distributed, simultaneous, and integrated.
1. Multi-Dimensional
This characteristic is an expansion of the concept of battlespace which was first
introduced in the recent edition ofFM 100-5.
Battlespace is a physical volume that expands or contracts in relation to the
ability to acquire and engage the enemy. It includes the breadth, depth, and
height in which the commander positions and moves assets over time.
[Ref. 11: p. 6-12]
Historically the process that commanders used to plan operations was very
constrictive. They were given a set area of operations (i.e., piece of ground) within which
to plan and conduct operations. The notion of battlespace allows the commanders to
expand their thinking to develop a vision for dominating the enemy and protecting the
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force before any mental constraints are emplaced, such as overlays depicting phase lines,
boundaries, and arrows. It is an attempt to encourage commanders to "think out of the
box" and brainstorm actions given the factors of Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain, and
Time Available (METT-T). Instead of concentrating on just one piece of land,
commanders must consider all factors that have an impact on operations.
Force XXI extends this notion of battlespace. Operations go beyond the
traditional physical dimensions of breadth, depth, and height. Battlespace includes the
electro-magnetic spectrum which affects the digital connectivity of high tech weapon
systems and lines of communication. The battlespace is also expanded by the human
dimension. Commanders must not only consider soldiers and leaders, but also the civilian
population in which operations are being conducted, citizens and families in the U.S., and
the peoples of the world. Finally, time is a dimension of the battlespace that must be
mastered in order for commanders to synchronize all of the assets that can be brought to
bear against the enemy. This does not mean simply acting faster than the enemy, but
controlling the tempo of the battle to a speed which is best for execution of the plan. [Ref
32: p. 16]
With the influx of software intensive weapon systems, the U.S. should be able to
dominate this expanded battlespace. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 states that this expanded
battlespace "...will give future joint commanders a coherent vision of fully integrated, full-
dimensional [area of operations] and permit simultaneous engagement of targets by a
greater variety ofjoint warfighting systems." [Ref. 29: p. 3-8] It is interesting to note the
emphasis placed on the variety of weapon systems. It suggests that the U.S. should
investigate the possibility of procuring systems that can take full advantage of the multi-
dimensional characteristic of Force XXI operations.
2. Precise
Force XXI operations are characterized by the synchronization of multiple attacks
across the entire battlespace. One of the factors that facilitates these actions is precision.
Precision in decisive operations is enabled by three emerging capabilities. First,
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digitization provides soldiers and leaders at each echelon the information required to make
sound decisions. Second, a full entourage of sensors throughout the battlespace are linked
to analysts that are able to translate the data into useable form. This will provide clarity to
the battlefield and decrease the impact of "the fog of war." Third, simulations enable the
Army to plan, rehearse, and repetitively train different scenarios yielding precision in the
actual execution of operations.
Precision goes beyond precision strikes. It includes precision in the sustainment of
forces. Total asset visibility, reduced variability in combat support demand, and the
accuracy of GPS will enable logisticians to deliver the right support at the right place and
time Similarly, precision in force projection allows tailored forces to quickly move to
centers of gravity from which they can dominate the battlefield. Precision in combat
operations includes having the correct mix of offensive and defensive weapon systems in
order to shape and control the tempo of battle while concurrently maximizing the
protection of the force. All of these factors are empowered by increased situational
awareness that is provided by new high tech weapon systems. [Ref. 32: p. 17]
3. Non-Linear
Force XXI operations are characterized by non-linearity, executing tasks across
the entire battlespace rather than massing combat power at the Forward Line of Troops
(FLOT). The Cold War paradigm prescribed a linear, contiguous battlefield that rigidly
established the deep, close, and rear battle. In contrast, Force XXI operations utilize a
battlespace that is fluid, changing as METT-T changes through the duration of mission
preparation and execution. Units do not necessarily have to be arranged side-by-side in a
linear fashion. Instead, they can be maneuvered into situations that can best take
advantage of their capabilities (See Figure 3-3: Comparison of Linear and Non-Linear
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Figure 3-3. Comparison of Linear and Non-Linear Battlefields
awareness, because units may not be arrayed side-by-side as they are in the more
traditional contiguous operations.
4. Distributed Operations
Distributed Operations are closely related to the characteristic of a non-linear
battlefield. It means that "operations are executed where and when required to achieve
decisive effects vice concentrated at a possible decisive point." [Ref. 32: p. 18]
Distributed Operations empower subordinate leaders to take the initiative and apply
innovative ideas that are within the commander's intent of the operation. The result is a
synergistic effect that has the potential to be much more efficient than if the operation was
centrally synchronized by headquarters. There is a risk to Distributed Operations: chaos.
Leaders must understand that certain functions are best executed centrally such as
management of resources. There must be a continual effort to find the optimal mix of
centralized and decentralized operations through testing, experiments, and simulations.
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5. Simultaneous
The concept of decentralized operations that is multi-dimensional, precise,
distributed, and non-linear yields the capability to conduct simultaneous operations across
the battlespace. Simultaneous operations seize the initiative and present the enemy
leadership with multiple crisis, but no effective response. Digitization creates the ability to
plan, coordinate, and execute actions simultaneously. "Each of these actions creates an
effect, the sum of which is greater than if they were discrete and sequential. Rather than a
single concentrated attack, execute a series of attacks (lethal and non-lethal) as near-
simultaneously as possible." [Ref. 32: p. 18]
Simply stated, simultaneous attack enables the commander to directly influence the
enemy throughout the width, height, and depth of his battlespace to stun, then rapidly
defeat an enemy. Indications of these possibilities were seen in both Just Cause and
Desert Storm. By massing the effects of long and short-range area and precision fires,
integrated with rapid combined arms maneuver, on the ground and from the air, a larger
and less agile enemy force can be quickly and decisively defeated. Although these attacks
may not be simultaneous in application from the enemy's perspective, they will appear
seamless and nearly simultaneous in effect.
6. Integrated
The Army does not fight alone. Force XXI fully integrates operations with other
Services, other national agencies, and often allied and coalition forces. Recent operations
such as in Bosnia suggest that war and OOTW will continue to be a coordinated effort
with NATO or other countries. Force XXI takes advantage of the increased variety of
forces and maximizes their potential through shared information.
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E. PATTERNS OF OPERATIONS
In addition to outlining the characteristics of Force XXI operations, the Army
recognizes that operations will be executed through a series of deliberate patterns. These
patterns incorporate all elements of operations, from initial receipt of mission through
return to home station. The patterns are not phases nor are they sequential. The patterns
serve to focus the many tasks armies have always performed in war and other military
operations. The patterns of Force XXI operations are: project the force, protect the
force, gain information dominance, shape the battlespace, decisive operations, and sustain
the force. These patterns provide a basis for the organization of warfighting experiments
and the discussion of concepts. Further, these patterns assist in assigning responsibilities
or dividing FOCs to the particular branch schools and battle labs. For example, the Armor
and Infantry branches concentrate on decisive operations, while the Intelligence branch
concentrates on gaining information dominance. Since the purpose of defining these
patterns is to focus the Army on the many tasks they have to accomplish, it is logical that
these patterns also focus discussions on determining requirements. Therefore, the next
section of this chapter provides a brief overview of these patterns.
1. Project the Force
Force XXI operations are based on the ability to project power. No longer does
the Army have huge contingencies of soldiers forward deployed at strategic 'hot spots"
around the world. Instead, most of the force is based in the U.S. and must deploy to the
theater of operations. Projecting force is much more than deployment, however. First,
with a streamlined organization of fewer soldiers, the Army no longer has the luxury to
commit an overwhelming amount of units to a single conflict without risking security
concerns in other areas. Instead, they must carefully plan which and how many units are
needed for a particular conflict. Emphasizing modularity of organizations and units
facilitates a rapid tailoring of forces according to METT-T. Concurrent to tailoring the
force, is mission planning and rehearsal. "Automated systems and simulations provide the
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capability to plan, coordinate and wargame, leading to team building and training that
result in effective execution immediately upon arrival in theater." [Ref. 32: p. 20] This
means the Army must be prepared to 'hit the ground running" whether using early entry
forces marrying up with prepostioned equipment, or forced entry with special combat
units The implication of this is that C^I structure must be in place or usable on the move.
Project the force goes farther than just the initial entry. In order to conduct
distributed operations on a non-linear battlefield, the Army must have the capability of
quickly moving forces throughout the battlespace at any point in time during the
operation. The battle will be more fluid with fewer stops to regroup than in the past. The
tempo of Force XXI operations will be more similar to the actions of a soccer match,
rather than the Cold War paradigm of a football game. Mobility and flexible are important
aspects of force projection.
2. Protect the Force
Force XXI takes a holistic approach to protecting the force. Soldiers, equipment,
and intelligence must be protected throughout all stages of operations. The common
elements of force protection are: avoid detection, prevent acquisition, avert hit, survive,
and preventive attack.
To avoid detection, forces need common situational awareness. This enables early
and accurate Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) which optimizes the
emplacement of security forces by estimating where enemy forces will appear. Situational
awareness also facilitates greater dispersion, increasing enemy targeting difficulties. The
traditional means of stealth, such as smoke and camouflage, will be combined with stealth
equipment to help units avoid detection. If detected, the unit must prevent acquisition.
Mobility, flexibility, and counter-radar devices all assist in preventing acquisition. If
acquired, the unit must avert the hit through counter-missile systems or common skills
such as Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) decontamination. If hit, the unit must
survive through combat lifesaving skills and telemedicine. [Ref. 32: p. 21]
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3. Gain Information Dominance
Gaining information dominance is an important aspect of Force XXI operations. It
is defined as "..creating a disparity between what we know about our battlespace and
operations within it and what the enemy knows." [Ref. 32: p. 22] Better intelligence,
shared among all elements and moved or retrieved rapidly on demand, will allow
commanders to control and vary the tempo based on superior knowledge of friendly
situation/location, enemy situation/location, and events shaping the overall battlespace.
Information dominance is imperative in taking the initiative to shape the battlespace and
dominate the enemy through decisive operations.
The importance of gaining information dominance cannot be understated. The
Army recently devoted an entire Field Manual (FM 100-6) to the subject of Information
Operations (10). It emphasized that these operations require continuous efforts to obtain
information on the enemy while denying them friendly information. There will be times
when information parity exists and it is important to continue to fight for dominance. 10
is more than just information warfare, however. It includes establishing and maintaining
the means of using information (communications, nets, digitized networks). There is
technology that exists today that can be useful in obtaining this goal. TRADOC pamphlet
525-5 emphasized this fact by stating:
The manner of conducting joint land operations does not rely for its
existence solely upon future technologies. Force XXI operations are
possible with existing technologies; we are simply not yet sufficiently
tactically adaptable nor have we changed some battle processes to take full
advantage of such versatility...Our weapons can strike anywhere in our
battlespace, but we cannot fully control them or sense their effects.
Intelligence systems can provide detailed images, yet the full
synchronization of all this capability is not realized. Evolving information
technologies will almost undoubtedly unlock the full potential of Force
XXI operations... This ongoing doctrinal development will place the Army
in the lead of the revolution in military affairs. [Ref. 29: p. 3-20]
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4. Shape the Battlespace
'The purpose of shaping the battlespace is to set the conditions for friendly success
in decisive operations." [Ref. 32: p. 23] It involves proactively forcing the enemy to take
action and posturing friendly forces to take advantage of this situation. The objective is to
defeat the enemy's capability to fight coherently before committing friendly forces in
decisive operations.
The key to successfully shaping the battlespace is, once again, intelligence. A
precise EPB can identify enemy formations, equipment, and courses of actions. With this
as a basis, commanders can use both lethal and nonlethal fires to eliminate enemy
capabilities, and use sensors to assess the effects. Dynamic obstacles and countermobility
assets can force the enemy into kill sacks, electronic warfare can disrupt their command
and control, and concurrently, friendly forces can maneuver into advantageous positions.
Simultaneously, economy of force operations including civil and public affairs, counter-
intelligence, and military police allow decisive operations to mass effects against the
enemy's main effort.
As with information operations, shaping the battlespace is a continuous effort:
commanders must plan, execute, assess, and plan again. It takes a coordinated effort
between sensors, shooters, and maneuver elements. It cannot be assumed that friendly
forces will always be able to shape the battlefield. Commanders must rely on real time
intelligence in order to fully take advantage of all opportunities. When the battlespace is
successfully shaped, friendly forces can dominate the enemy through decisive operations.
5. Decisive Operations
Decisive operations defeat the enemy's will to fight. In combat operations that
means winning a battle, engagement, or campaign. In OOTW this means accomplishing
military or national objectives. Within the patterns of operations, decisive operations are
the means of achieving success.
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Decisive Operations require the synchronization of all combat power and combat
multipliers throughout the battlespace, attacking the enemy in all dimensions nearly
simultaneously. Concurrently striking the enemy at multiple critical points in a specific
sequence, appearing to the enemy as a simultaneous action, will destroy his critical forces
and functions. This will lead to a quick, decisive defeat of his force as a whole.
Force XXI operations may utilize much of the same equipment as today: tanks,
howitzers, helicopters and rifles. What will be significantly different will be the planning,
coordination, and employment of these systems. Overmatching situational awareness, a
product of digitization, will yield more precise, effective and efficient maneuver and fires.
This will enable Army elements to mass effects without the risk of massing forces.
Information dominance will enhance the ability to shape the battlefield so that the Army
can fight when and where it wants to fight. The end result of decisive operations is to
force the enemy to give up its will to fight. [Ref. 32: p. 24]
6. Sustain the Force
Sustainment is prevalent in all patterns of operations. It is the responsibility of all
personnel and not just the logistician. The varied demands of war and OOTW require the
development of a logistics system that is versatile, deployable, and expansible. Modular
units in both active and reserve components will allow rapid force logistics tailoring. This
future logistics system must be able to support both joint and multinational forces. The
system must also be able to keep pace with the maneuver units
The key to successful sustainment in Force XXI operations is situational
awareness. Total asset visibility, digitally tracking the location of supplies, maintenance
items, and equipment from logistic bases to the user, will streamline the sustainment
process and reduce the overhead of inventory control. Weapon systems with self-
diagnostic capabilities that are tied directly into the sustainment system might potentially
reduce the variability of demand and reduce required inventory levels. Commonality of
parts between all Services of DoD will further facilitate the streamlining of sustainment.
All of these actions will enable leaders to make informed decisions, allowing Army
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elements to execute proactive versus reactive logistics. Integrating materiel capabilities
with operational and organizational innovations into an overall sustainment concept is
essential in order to maintain the fluid battlefield and the increased, yet controlled, tempo
of Force XXI operations. [Ref. 32: p. 25]
F. IMPLICATIONS OF FORCE XXI OPERATIONS
This chapter has broadly described the concepts of Force XXI operations To
identify the implications of these concepts, one must first analyze the validity of the
Army's assumptions about the global trends and future threats. The Army contends that
global trends of instability indicate that the U.S. will face challenges of unprecedented
complexity, diversity, and scope as we move into the 21st Century. Further, it contends
that the days of the all-purpose doctrinal threat template (i.e., Soviet Model) are gone.
The U.S. faces a wide array of new threats and unknown dangers in an environment of
worldwide proliferation of warfighting technologies, to include weapons of mass
destruction.
The author researched numerous publications, informally interviewed many faculty
members of the National Security Affairs and System Management Departments at the
Naval Postgraduate School, and attended lectures by high ranking Government officials.
Although specific thoughts about the future varied slightly from source to source, the
general themes throughout all of the sources overwhelmingly validates the Army's
assumptions
This does not mean that the future threat spectrum, outlined previously, is
completely accurate nor will it remain constant in the future. The U.S. must continually
access the validity of the model and make improvements. However, in general, it is
accurate enough to serve as a threat model for developing operational concepts for the
future. In fact the Army is using this model not only for Force XXI operations, but also
for its Joint Vision which looks out to the year 2010 and for the Army After Next which
looks out to the year 2025 and beyond. [Ref. 20] Therefore, the researcher makes the
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general observation that the future forces of the U.S. face a great variety of threats in
a global environment with unprecedented complexities.
Given the validity of these assumptions, we can further discuss the implications of
Force XXI operations. First, the doctrinal concepts state that the Army will be required to
conduct a variety of missions (i.e., The Army must be versatile). The President of the
United States, Bill Clinton, confirmed this belief in a commencement speech to West Point
cadets in 1993: 'You will be called upon in many ways in the new era to keep the peace,
to relieve suffering, to help teach officers from new democracies in the ways of a
democratic army, and still... to win our wars" [Ref 7] Recent history has also confirmed
this belief. Over the past decade, deployments ranged from conventional wars, like the
Gulf War, to OOTW like hurricane and flood relief. Once again, President Clinton noted
this increased variety in an article in the Armed Forces Journal :
...Our defense readiness is historically high and our forces' capabilities
proven—whether they are restoring democracy to Haiti, deterring
aggression in the Persian Gulf, saving lives in Rwanda or bringing stability
to Bosnia. Some have doubted that our troops can simultaneously
maintain their warfighting superiority and conduct peacekeeping and
humanitarian missions. I say, just ask Saddam Hussein and the Haitian
people. [Ref. 6]
Given this recent history of deployments and the global trends of instability, it is
likely that the Army will continue to be called upon to conduct a variety of missions.
The characteristics and patterns of Force XXI operations place great emphasis on
knowledge-based operations, mobility, and the ability to tailor forces. This has several
implications on the organizational structure of the Army and the capabilities of materiel.
In order to have the capability of rapidly tailoring organizations for operations, the Army
is seriously considering a modular design of both combat and combat support units. The
current organizational structure is based on brigade or battalion sized task forces that are
deployed in a full-up, uniform fashion. A modular design will allow commanders to
construct forces by picking and choosing different platoons to form a composite task
force. While this disaggregation of units facilitates creating a force who's size is
commensurate with its mission, the Army must fully understand all implications before
blindly going to this ad hoc, modular design. For instance, what effects will a modular
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design have on training or the cohesiveness and esprit de corps of units? Nonetheless,
such an approach potentially contributes to the application of Requisite Variety.
In addition to being modular, the new doctrinal paradigm of knowledge-based
operations emphasizes organizing around information processing and dissemination. [Ref.
29: p. 4-5] The emerging doctrine stresses the importance of increasing the speed and
accuracy of the friendly decision cycle through enhanced command, control and
intelligence. At the same time, the doctrine emphasizes the requirement to disrupt the
enemy's decision cycle through attacks on his command, control and intelligence. The
combination of attacking an adversary's use of information while enhancing and protecting
friendly information should provide a decisive advantage.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 provides a good summary of the implications of this
new emerging doctrine:
All Army forces must be rapidly deployable, highly survivable, lethal, agile,
mobile, modular in design, and equipped to respond to the full range of
military operations. Forces must be designed to enable rapid but flexible
transition from War to OOTW or vice versa. The commander must be
given the assets to include flexible, versatile organizations to dominate
battle space. Commanders must have the capability to rapidly assemble,
deploy, and employ a force with the required mix of capabilities. They
must be provided the assets to dominate battle space. [Ref. 29: p. 4-6]
In addition to emphasizing capabilities, the Army states that Force XXI operations
are based on principles. One can argue that Force XXI operations are still tied directly to
the nine principles of war which provide an enduring bedrock for Army doctrine. The
U.S. Army published its first discussion of the principles of war in a 1921 Army training
regulation. These principles, although slightly revised, have withstood the test of time.
The nine principles of war, as defined by the Army are: [Ref. 11: pp. 2-4 to 2-6]
• Objective. Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive,
and attainable objective.
• Offensive. Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
• Mass. Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place
and time.
44
• Economy of Force. Employ all combat power available in the most effective
way possible, allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
• Maneuver. Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible
application of combat power.
• Unity of Command. For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of
effort.
• Security. Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.
• Surprise. Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is
unprepared.
• Simplicity. Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure
thorough understanding.
Force XXI operations clearly maintain the integrity of all but one of these nine
principles, mass. At first glance Distributed Operations seems to be the opposite of mass.
However, mass should not be interpreted as a concentration of forces. 'Synchronizing all
the elements of combat power where they will have decisive effect on an enemy force in a
short period of time is to achieve mass" [Ref 11: p. 2-4] Decisive effect is the key.
Distribution provides agility which allows commanders to execute operations when and
where required to achieve decisive effects. When combined with the characteristic of
Simultaneity, Distributed Operations can achieve mass.
Many authors have attempted to go beyond the principles of war and identify
features that have made the operational aspects of warfare through the ages basically the
same in war after war. In his book The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare , Colonel
Trevor N. Dupuy described the following thirteen fundamental operational features which
he called the "timeless verities of combat." [Ref. 14: pp. 326-333]
1
.
Offensive action is essential to positive combat results.
2. Defensive strength is greater than offensive strength.
3. Defensive posture is necessary when successful offense is impossible.
4. Flank or rear attack is more likely to succeed than frontal attack.
5. Initiative permits application of preponderant combat power.
6. Defenders' chances of success are directly proportional to fortification strength.
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7. An attacker willing to pay the price can always penetrate the strongest
defenses.
8. Successful defense requires depth and reserves.
9. Superior strength always wins.
10. Surprise substantially enhances combat power.
1 1
.
Firepower kills, disrupts, suppresses, and causes dispersion.
12. Combat activities are slower, less productive, and less efficient than
anticipated.
13. Combat is too complex to be described in a single, simple aphorism.
An analysis of the Army's conceptual doctrine suggests that Force XXI
operations, although from a different paradigm, seem to incorporate or give consideration
to all of these 'timeless verities of combat." Force XXI operations emphasize the offense,
seizing the initiative, and decisive operations using depth and simultaneous attacks
throughout the battlespace. They not only focus on flank and rear attacks, but operations
from many different dimensions.
Given these comparisons, the researcher concludes that Force XXI operations are
arguably based both on capabilities and principles. This seems to suggest that most
personnel involved with the Army's requirements determination process (materiel and
doctrine) understand the process. However, the reality of the situation is exactly the
opposite. In a study conducted in November of 1995, the General Accounting Office
(GAO) found that the Army's Digital Battlefield Plan lacked specific measurable goals and
contained numerous risks.
The Army's plan to digitize the battlefield is expensive, contains many
risks, and lacks specific, measurable goals for the series of large-scale
experiment that are to be conducted. [Without specific, measurable goals]
the Army is unnecessarily risking additional investments amounting to $397
million for digital systems needed to conduct increasingly larger scale
experiments to fiscal year 1999. Based on Army estimates, the investment
required to digitize a 10 division Army could be as high as $4 billion. [Ref.
16]
The GAO is not the only organization that is incredulous of this requirements
process. In numerous informal interviews conducted from 1994 to present, the researcher
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has found that service members of the US Army are also skeptical. Many feel that S&T is
driving doctrine and that the Army is getting away from the basic principles of war.
Others are encouraged, but feel that the Army is planning too far ahead. They believe that
TRADOC is playing "Star Wars" at the expense of current conditions where battles are
still "fought in the mud."
These findings suggest that the Army has not clearly justified its process for
requirements determination to either Congress or its service members. To properly
examine and integrate new digital warfighting concepts with S&T, the Army must have a
framework and a vocabulary for intellectually examining and communicating future
battlefield requirements.
G. SUMMARY
This chapter discussed the Army's Force XXI operational concepts. The Army
validly makes the assumption that the future forces of the U.S. face a great variety of
threats in a global environment with unprecedented complexities. In order to deal with
this complex environment, the Army has outlined warfighting concepts that emphasize
knowledge-based operations: a shared common and timely perception of the battlefield.
These knowledge-based operations are characterized by multiple dimensions, simultaneous
attacks of precision fires that are distributed throughout the battlespace, and integration
with other Services and nations.
These concepts contribute to the foundation of requirements determination. They
must be clearly understood by all personnel involved in the process. The Army is looking
towards future capabilities, yet claims Force XXI operations are firmly grounded to the
principles of war. While this claim is arguably true, the researcher has found that many
personnel do not understand these concepts and how they fit into future force
requirements. The researcher postulates that the Army needs a framework to properly
examine and integrate these future warfighting concepts with advanced technical
capabilities and determine future battlefield requirements. The question is what kind of
framework and how will it be applied?
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The answer to this question lies in the pathologies that have been identified in this
study. Chapter II identified that the current requirements determination process does not
directly address the need for variety in our forces. Force XXI operations have a similar
pathology. While they indicate there is an increasing amount of variety in the future threat
spectrum, they do not indicate how much variety is needed in friendly forces, or if there is
even a need for variety. The researcher posits that a framework can be developed using
Requisite Variety as a base. The framework will innovate the requirements determination
process and provide an intellectual foundation for discussing Force XXI operations. The
next two chapters of this study present a conceptual framework to achieve this objective.
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IV. THE THEORY OF REQUISITE VARIETY
A. INTRODUCTION
The remainder of this study presents a new paradigm, based on existing building
blocks, but essentially a new system with new internal dynamics. It develops a conceptual
framework based on the theory of Requisite Variety with which to innovate the
requirements determination process and articulate future operational needs to all
organizations. The initial efforts of this section define the theory of Requisite Variety and
present a theoretical background. With this as a basis, chapter five forms a framework
with which to analyze requirements with respect to requisite variety. Chapters six and
seven examine the utility of the framework through an analysis of a TRADOC warfighting
experiment and summarize the research findings. The researcher expects to find that
Requisite Variety has a direct application to the military, and in fact, serves as a basis for
many of the Force XXI operational concepts.
B. THE LAW OF REQUISITE VARIETY
The Law of Requisite Variety was discovered in the early 1950's by the British
cybertician, Ross Ashby. Ashby studied techniques to control complex systems. He
realized that the more complex a system, the more difficult it is to understand and control.
Stafford Beer explained this concept in his book, DECISION AND CONTROL: The
meaning of Operational Research and Management Cybernetics.
The more complex a system, the more difficult it is to define its structure
(its interrelationships) and consequently, the more difficult to predict its
behavior. As the components of a system increase in number, the
interrelationships typically increase, and the system is said to possess more
variety than it did initially. [Ref 4: p. 85]
Consider a relatively simple model in which a commander is responsible for
controlling a system. There are two sides, friendly and enemy, each with conflicting
objectives. The system is a campaign or battle where "controlling the system" means
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Source Ref. 4: p.276
Figure 4-1. System Control
internal relationships found in the system, but outside factors influence the situation in a
way the commander cannot control or sometimes even foresee. For instance, each side
has a definite number of courses of action (COAs) from which to choose to fight the
battle. The friendly commander has the authority and responsibility to choose from his
COAs in order to "control the system" (defeat the enemy). He has the authority to control
the timing of his forces' actions, the mix of soldiers and equipment, and the preparation of
his forces before the battle. However, the commander does not have the authority to
control the actions of higher headquarter forces, the type of terrain and weather, or other
influences from the outside environment. For example, during OOTW and operations
against Internal Security Forces there might be large numbers of civilians in the area which
influence the system. The enemy itself influences the outside environment, initiating a
chain reaction which the commander cannot control. The box containing the enemy is
irregularly drawn to represent that the boundaries of real-life problems are not rectilinear,
but sometimes indescribable.
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In order to simplify the system we will assume that all the influences on the enemy
will be channeled through a single input and all the effects it exerts will be channeled into a
single output. The actions/information from the enemy passes to the commander who, in
turn, passes instructions into the situation in order to control the system. A closed loop is
thereby artificially created. As the situation grows in complexity the variety in the system
proliferates. Given that sufficient information about this proliferation of variety can flow
along the output channel, and that it reaches the commander, how is the commander going
to maintain control?
The answer to this question is found in an important principle Ashby has called the
Law of Requisite Variety. Ashby discovered that the amount of variety in the control
mechanism has to be at least the same as in the system being controlled. In order to win
the battle, the different types ofCOAs available to the friendly commander must be greater
than or equal to that of his enemy. If there is enough variety to provide for a one-to-one
transfer from the control mechanism to the system, then there is "requisite" variety. As
Ashby states, "Only variety can destroy variety." [Ref 2: p. 208]
At first glance Ashby' s theory might seem entirely too obvious and simplistic to
some commanders. They might state, "Of course if you give me more tanks or more
soldiers I will defeat the enemy; I will overpower them!" However, the Law of Requisite
Variety should not be confused with the size or number of COAs. Obviously, a greater
amount of tanks and/or soldiers will generate more options for the commander because of
the number of permutations that are generated. The researcher realizes that from the
commander's perspective, this may represent more variety. But Ashby was concerned
about qualitative variety not quantitative variety. For example, chapter three discussed
one of the characteristics of Force XXI operations, that it is multi-dimensional. For
purposes of review, multi-dimensional is a concept which expanded the notion of
battlespace. Force XXI battlespace will include not only breadth, depth, and height, but
also the dimensions of humans, time, and the electro-magnetic spectrum. If the
commander has weapon systems that can fully exploit all of these dimensions, then he can
dominate the battlefield. In Ashby' s terms, the commander has the requisite variety to
control the system. In fact, if the commander has requisite variety in weapon systems, he
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could still dominate the battlefield even if his aggregate number of systems is less than the
enemy's. Still, the skeptical commander may view Ashby's theory as too obvious and
state that this fact has been known for quite some time. If this is true, then why does the
Army fail to directly assess variety in its requirements determination process, and why do
so many leaders fail to understand the basics of Force XXI operations? To answer these
questions it is useful to understand the methods that commanders have used to "control
situations" (defeat the enemy) in the past.
Generally, there are two schools of thought that have been captured in doctrine
and taught to leaders at various TRADOC institutions. The first declares that a study of
the enemy will reveal patterns and trends in his actions. These patterns will enable
experienced commanders to feed instructions back to the situation through its input loop
and modify its behavior. During the Cold War era the Army spent many years studying
and analyzing Soviet doctrine and tactics. Intelligence Officers used enemy event
templates to try to predict what actions the enemy might take. Acquisition of weapon
systems, and the commander's choice of a COA depended on this intelligence.
The second school of thought, corresponding roughly to the position of
operational research (OR), is more realistically aware of the magnitude of the problem. It
says that there is too much information to control, and that the thing to do is to create an
analytic model ofwhat is going on. Therefore, the commander had his battle staff conduct
force ratio analysis and use decision support templates to assist him in choosing a COA.
The two schools are identical in principle, but the OR approach insists that the
processes utilized by the first approach can be far more efficient if modern scientific
techniques are used. In practice, both schools of thought were utilized. Due to the fact
that the U.S. had a single enemy for over fifty years, a great amount of information was
available to the commanders. Soviet style doctrine revealed discernible patterns and
trends. A commander could use this knowledge to control the battlefield. Further, he
used his battle staff to help him quantify decisions and to choose between alternative
COAs Both of these schools of thought were successful, and although the concept of
variety might have been known, it was not directly needed for success. However, the
Cold War is over and, as we have shown in the previous chapter, the future forces of the
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U.S. face a great variety of threats in a global environment with unprecedented
complexities. This new environment injects a large amount of uncertainty and variety into
the battle or campaign. The environmental disturbance can be quite arbitrary and
unpatterned. From the standpoint of the commander trying to control the system, it might
seem inexplicable. So as the complexity of the environment increases, as we have seen
over the last decade, neither of these two strategies has any real hope of providing
adequate control. A new paradigm, using the Law of Requisite Variety is needed to help
control the system.
These standpoints may be examined in light of an analogy from the game of
basketball. The basketball court can also be represented as an artificially isolated system
like the one depicted in Figure 4-1. Five players in red uniforms constitute the first sub-
system — the enemy (situation). The purpose of this sub-system is readily identifiable
because the rules of basketball are known. The object is to move the ball to the opposite
end of the court and put it into the basket. Since each of the five men is free to follow any
kind of route up the court, and since the ball may be passed freely among them, the variety
of this sub-system proliferates to an enormous extent. Now control, in this context, means
to contain the sub-system. That is, prevent the five players in red uniforms from scoring a
basket. The question remains, how should this be done?
The commander from the first school of thought is inclined to watch the five
players in action for a while. He notices that they adopt a rather predictable pattern of
plays which, in practice, reduces the available variety. He notices that two of the men
tend to dominate the ball handling. These two players initiate the plays by driving to the
basket and passing off to a big man underneath the basket. The big man turns and lays the
ball into the basket. The conclusion is simple: position a player between the big man and
the basket so that he can block the shot. So an attempt is made to control the situation in
this way. Unhappily, the attacking team outwits this defense by passing to different
players and scoring from different positions. In recognition of this, other defenders have
to be added, and by a process of pattern-seeking and variety-trapping, an extensive group
of defenders is eventually built up.
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The commander with the second approach sees at once that a large number of
games will be lost before the patterns are recognized. Further, he realizes that the trial and
error process for determining control succeeds in defeating the opposing team only half
the time. Clearly, he needs a modern, analytic and scientific approach. Inspection of the
nature of the system, rather than experience of it in operation, reveals that each of the five
players in the system is governed by a control mechanism called a brain. Accordingly, our
commander hires a group of scientists to study each of the players personalities and skills.
The scientists develop a model ofhow the opposing team will play based on inputs such as
time of day, environmental conditions, length of the game, and the physical condition of
the players. A software analyst then designs a software algorithm for the model, and
installs it on the commander's laptop computer. As the game begins, the commander
types the input data into the laptop. The computer analyses what is going on, constructs a
model of the strategy being employed, and makes predictions about the point where the
ball will be shot. The commander is then able to direct a player to this point in time to
block the shot. In the context of the example, this is a caricature. In real life, however,
many commanders have tried many foolish things.
Ashby would view these massive arrangements with amusement. Certainly they
are scientific: they recognize the proliferation of variety of which the attacking system is
capable and take measures to deal with it. But of course Ashby knows that the best way
in which to control the system of five men in red uniforms, is to put five men in white
uniforms on to the court. This solution, Ashby contends, will be at least as effective as the
last one. Moreover, if the white team can be trained to proliferate its variety a little more
quickly, or to be less predictable in their patterns, the control is likely to succeed most of
the time. In terms of the example just considered, the theory of Requisite Variety simply
says that if each red-uniformed player is marked by a white-uniformed player then, on the
average, whatever the actual play undertaken by the red team, sufficient variety can
proliferate in the white team to match it.
Once again, there should be a distinction between quantitative variety and
qualitative variety. Consider once again our basketball analogy. In this scenario we will
make the number of players the same for both teams. The white team consists of players
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who are defensive specialists, but have limited offensive skills. The red team consists of
multi-talented players who are skilled at playing both offense and defense. In this
situation, the white team has limited its variety by relying on the defensive specialists.
They have "put all their eggs in one basket." Once again, there is a high probability that
the white team will lose the game. This scenario shows that it is the factor of variety, not
end strength, that determines which team will most likely control the game. ADM Joseph
Prueher, commander-in-chief, U.S. Pacific Command made a similar type of analogy in
describing the importance of Joint Warfare:
...each service (Army, Navy, Air Force) brings a unique capability to the
battlefield. It is similar to a football team. You can't have a team with all
fast receivers with good hands. In addition you need strong, relatively
slow lineman, defensive specialists, and a quarterback. This is the nature
and strength of Joint Warfare. [Ref 21]
Ashby's law can be illustrated in a simple matrix model of a game as shown in
Table 4- 1 . In the first scenario, each side has an equal number of options from which to
choose. The friendly commander's COAs are listed on the left (Fl, F2, F3) and the enemy
commander's COAs are listed on the top (El, E2, E3). They both can see the table and
the rules are as follows: The enemy must play first by selecting a COA, and thus, a
particular column. The friendly commander, knowing this selection, then chooses a COA,
and thus, a particular row. The outcome of the game is determined by the intersection of
the selected row and column and is represented in the table by bold, italic letters. If the
outcome is a, the friendly commander wins. If it is not a, the friendly commander loses.
El E2 E3
Fl b a c
F2 a c b
F3 c b a
Table 4-1. Matrix Model One of Ashby's Law
In examining Table 4-1, it is evident that the friendly commander can dominate the
enemy. Regardless of the enemy COA, the friendly commander can choose a COA which
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the outcome becomes a (therefore he can always win). The friendly commander's
dominate strategy options are:
If enemy selects El, I shall select F2
If enemy selects E2, 1 shall select Fl
If enemy selects E3, I shall select F3
Therefore, in this best case scenario where all moves are known, the friendly
commander has "requisite" variety to control the game no matter what COA the enemy
commander chooses.
Now consider a second, more complex scenario as depicted in Table 4-2. The
rules of the game are the same as in the previous scenario: both commanders can see the
COAs and outcomes, and the enemy commander must select first. However in this
scenario the enemy commander has more COAs from which to choose and the outcomes
are more complex.
El E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8
Fl f k m b g c a h
F2 g a d c 1 J h b
F3 1 h c a J b c d
Table 4-2. Matrix Model Two of Ashby's Law
This scenario clearly shows that the friendly commander cannot dominate or
control the system. In order to control the system he must have the ability to choose a
COA which will produce the outcome a for every enemy COA that is played. Since the
enemy commander has COAs that do not produce the outcome a, the friendly commander
cannot dominate the game. He cannot assure victory against the numerous COAs the
enemy commander might choose. In fact, the friendly commander can only win if the
enemy chooses COAs E2, E4, or E7. In this sense, the friendly commander does not
possess the requisite variety needed to control the system.
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Now let's consider our basketball analogy. This time we will allow the white team
to field five players and we will limit the red team to three players. Clearly the white team
has the requisite variety to control the game. This statement would be true if we were to
consider only the quantity of players and not the quality. However, if the players on the
red team are skilled in shooting both outside and inside shots, and the players on the white
team can only defend against inside shots, then the outcome is different. This scenario is
depicted in Table 4-3.
El El E2 E2 E3 E3
A B A B A B
Fl f a m a g a
F2 g a d a 1 a
F3 b a 1 a h a
F4 c a d a c a
F5 1 a c a J a
Table 4-3. Basketball Matrix Model
The players on the red team are listed on the top (El - E3). Each of them have
two options: shoot from the outside (El A) or shoot from the inside (E1B). The players
on the white team are listed on the left side (Fl - F5). Recall that they are only adept at
defending inside shots, thus they only have one option each. The table shows that the
white team can only control the game 50% of the time. That is, despite having more
players, the white team lacked the qualitative variety to completely stop the red team from
scoring.
From the above examples, it is clear that an organization can better control a
system when it has variety in the control system. In a complex system it is not realistic,
from a practical or affordability sense, to assume that an organization can possess the
"requisite" variety to control the system. Basically what occurs is the organization
develops variety only for those COAs that have a high probability of occurrence. Beer
suggests that the organization can improve its probabilities by regulating the system to
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reduce uncertainty. How can uncertainty be reduced? The answer is through information.
"Information extinguishes variety, and the reduction of variety is one of the techniques of
control, not because it simplifies the system to be controlled, but because it makes the
system more predictable" [Ref. 5: p. 87]
Consider once again the basketball team preparing for an important game. It will
scout its upcoming opponents to determine the pattern of tactics which the team is likely
to employ. The proliferation of variety which the opposing team is capable of employing
is obviously great, but nevertheless, the scouting team will deduce some patterns with a
high probability of occurrence. This would be especially true if the opposing team's
"power" is centered around a few individuals. The scouting team, in an effort to control
the situation (game), will try to counteract this variety by adjusting its own resources. In
comparison, this is essentially the role of intelligence to the Army commander in battlefield
operations. A unit will typically acquire (scout) environmental information (terrain,
weather, enemy situation, political factors, the state of enemy weapon systems, enemy
activities, and so on) in order to reduce the uncertainty of the operation.
The examples given above seem great, but they have a fundamental flaw. It is the
same flaw that the commanders of the first school of thought have: when the environment
has an overwhelming amount of complexity, it is nearly impossible to deduce the patterns.
Therefore, the information from the "scout team" will not have much utility. This is
because the variety that each team possesses is set and cannot be changed once the game
starts. Information does not destroy variety; however, information can reduce the
uncertainty of the situation and help to regulate the system. Consider the following
scenario with our basketball teams. There are ten seconds left to play and the score is
tied. The red team has the ball and has called a time-out to discuss their strategies. The
coach of the white team sends his assistant over towards the red team's bench in an
attempt to discover what play the red team will use. If the assistant is successful, the
white team can use this information to plan their defense. In this example, the variety of
each team has not changed. The information has simply reduced the uncertainty of what
option the red team will choose. Similarly, if a commander can obtain real-time
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information about the enemy, he can use this information in order to reduce the
uncertainty of the situation and regulate the variety of the operation or campaign.
The researcher will examine this concept, and its effects on Force XXI operations,
in later chapters of this study. The concept is presented here in a general sense, to
complement the previous analysis of the theory of Requisite Variety and make this
important conclusion:
The theory of Requisite Variety has a direct application to military
operations, future doctrine development, and requirements determination.
C. SUMMARY
The act of engaging in war and OOTW is complex and contains a great deal of
uncertainty As systems such as these become more complex, the variety in the systems is
said to proliferate and the systems are harder to control. The theory of Requisite Variety
indicates that in order to control a complex system the amount of variety in the control
mechanism must equal that in the system itself. In a military context, the different COAs
available to the friendly commander must be greater than or equal to that of his enemy.
There are two types of variety: quantitative and qualitative. The theory of Requisite
Variety shows that a commander that possesses enough qualitative variety can dominate
the battlefield even if he has inferior numbers when compared to his enemy. Finally this
chapter demonstrated that information can reduce the uncertainty of the situation and
assist in regulating the system.
Game theory was used in this chapter to analyze Requisite Variety. It is clear that
game theory has a strong correlation to military operations; numerous studies have shown
the relationship between game theory and military decision making. O. G. Haywood
introduced this concept in 1954 by stating,
The doctrine of decision of the armed forces of the United States is a
doctrine based on enemy capabilities. A commander is enjoined to select
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the course of action which offers the greatest promise of success in view of
the enemy capabilities. [Ref. 18]
But how does the theory of Requisite Variety apply to determining future
operational requirements? The next chapter of this study answers this question by
developing a framework using requisite variety as a foundation.
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V. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter directly applies the theory of Requisite Variety to the process of
determining the future requirements of the Army. The first section describes a conceptual
framework for providing commanders the necessary variety with which to dominate the
battlefield. Next, the framework is applied to Force XXI operations suggesting a
prioritization of weapon systems based on budgetary and global conditions. Finally, the
chapter examines what impact the framework has on other Services.
B. VARIETY IS A FACTOR
The most significant finding of this study is that variety should be a factor in
determining requirements for the future operational forces of the U.S. Army. We have
seen that the future forces of the U.S. Army face a great variety of threats in a global
environment with unprecedented complexities. Ashby's theory of Requisite Variety
reveals that in order to control such complex systems, the amount of variety in the control
mechanism has to be at least the same as in the system being controlled. In other words,
in order to win the battle, the different COAs available to the commander must be greater
than or equal to that of his enemy. Clearly the Army recognizes the importance of variety;
for they have included the concept of versatility as a tenet of Army Operations in the
keystone doctrinal manual FM 100-5. But this manual's focus is on unit and individual
soldier skills, not overall requirements. It uses statements such as, "units must meet
diverse mission requirements" and "versatility requires competence in a variety of missions
and skills." Additionally, future warfighting concepts, such as those captured in
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, allude to the importance of variety. Despite its recognized
importance, the Army fails to use variety as a factor when determining requirements. The
Army should directly apply the theory of Requisite Variety in its requirements
determination process. TRADOC should make variety a factor in evaluating alternative
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weapon systems and force structures. All stakeholders including ICTs, materiel
developers, battle labs, and warfighters need to understand the concept of Requisite
Variety. The researcher postulates that the Army does not directly address variety in this
respect, because variety has historically been too hard to quantify and articulate.
For years, military planners have painstakingly developed complex, quantitative
formulas that attempt to compare forces in terms of their numbers and hardware. Military
literature is filled with detailed information on how many men, tanks, helicopters, vehicles,
aircraft, rockets, or submarines are available to each of the world's armed forces.
Attributes such as force ratios and combat strength have been integrated into complex
algorithms for use in computer simulations of war. While undoubtedly providing valuable
information, these methods offer few clues to the importance of intangibles such as
variety. Over the last two decades, the Army has placed increasing importance on the
value of intangible factors. If, as recent Army doctrine emphasizes, seizing the initiative,
better intelligence and communications, and better trained soldiers, more strongly
motivated, all count for more than sheer numbers, then the military balance may be
determined more by intangible, hard-to-quantify factors than by the usual, easy-to-count
factors to which previous military planners were accustomed. Such is the case with
Requisite Variety.
Although variety is hard to quantify, there are some very concrete ways to provide
commanders the necessary variety with which to dominate the enemy or situation.
Consider the relatively simple model introduced in chapter four in which a commander is
responsible for controlling a system. The system is a campaign or battle where
"controlling the system" means defeating the enemy. Actions and information from the
enemy pass to the friendly commander who, in turn, passes instructions into or acts upon
the situation in order to dominate the enemy. The system is simplified by excluding any
external factors from influencing the relationship between the enemy and the friendly
commander. In reality, external factors from the environment could potentially have a
significant impact on the system. Figure 5-1 shows an expanded model of the system
which includes its environment. As shown, the internal controls and relationships between





Figure 5-1. Framework for Providing Requisite Variety
depicted by the rectangle which encompasses the situation. This rectangle is drawn with
dashed lines to indicate that in real life, the environment is fluid, rather than static.
Highlighted in the model are the ways to provide commanders the necessary variety with
which to dominate the enemy: through regulation, information, and variety catalysts.
1. Regulation
Environmental factors can exert forces on the system which are out of the
commander's control. In some instances, these factors can reduce the complexity of the
system and therefore prevent the proliferation of variety. For instance, returning to the
basketball analogy, the General Manager of our basketball team is not within the internal
structure of the system, but he is clearly part of the environment. If the General Manager
could devise a schedule that avoided playing teams with good outside shooters, then the
variety of defensive skills that our players must possess is significantly decreased. In
military terms, environmental regulation could be a change to the National Military
Strategy (NMS) or Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The U.S. could decide not to use
military forces to counter phenomenological threats or conduct OOTW. This would
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reduce the variety of missions the Army has to perform and therefore, regulate the system.
Other examples of environmental regulation can be seen in newspapers, journals, and
televised debates. Many people argue that the U.S. should "bring home" the troops from
abroad and let other nations worry about their own defense.
This debate on the allocation of national resources is, in itself, a higher level
context model of the system depicted in Figure 5-1. The interfaces between these two
levels are discussed later in this study in the section titled, Impact On Other Services.
Theoretically, environmental regulation can succeed in reducing the complexity of the
system However, this type of regulation is normally out of the control of the commander
on the ground. It is important, though, to realize that this option might exist.
2. Information
Information assists the commander in obtaining requisite variety by reducing the
uncertainty of the system. Figure 5-1 shows all the possible enemy COAs flowing from
the enemy towards the commander. The enemy is limited by his own capacity and factors
of METT-T to choosing only one of these COAs. However, until the commander can see
or sense which COA the enemy will choose, the commander has to consider, plan for, or
deal with the various options available to the enemy. Therefore, the variety of the enemy
is constant and the commander must deal with the uncertainty of when, where, and how
the enemy will strike. Information, shown as a funnel in Figure 5-1, acts a filter to reduce
this uncertainty and facilitate proactive measures by the commander. This is one of the
key aspects of Force XXI operations. Information dominance enhances the ability to
shape the battlefield so that the commander can fight when and where he wants to fight. It
allows the commander to mass effects of various weapon systems at critical points without
the normally attendant risk of massing forces. It is key to understand that information
does not reduce or destroy the enemy's variety. Rather, it reduces the uncertainty of the
situation and helps the commander regulate the system. How information does this is
discussed in the next section of this chapter titled, Prioritizing Weapon Systems.
The model depicts all of the uncertainty flowing out of the enemy subsystem. In
reality, there is also a great deal of uncertainty flowing out of the commander subsystem:
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not only to the enemy, but among the units and soldiers that are led by the commander.
Some call this the "fog of war." To the soldier on the ground, it is the confusion or
uncertainty of where he is on the ground, where other units are, and what is happening on
the battlefield. Information can also help reduce this kind of uncertainty. This is what
common situational awareness on the digital battlefield is all about: knowing where you
are, where your buddies are, and where the enemy is. In this way, information
significantly contributes to providing the commander requisite variety.
In the previous chapter we saw how the basketball coach used information to help
win the game. He had his assistant coach monitor clandestinely the opposing team's
plans. Therefore, the uncertainty about which play the opposing team would execute was
reduced. Similarly, if the players had complete information on the location of their
teammates at all times, they could make better passes, synchronize their movements, and
outmaneuver their opponents. Many great basketball players attribute much of the their
success to this uncanny ability to see the whole court, .like they have eyes in the back of
their head. So we see that information makes a significant contribution to the objective of
providing the necessary variety with which to control the system.
Although information vastly improves warfighting capability, there are some
considerations that the Army must address. First, information technology is turning over
about every eighteen months. The Army must continue to streamline its process for
acquiring this technology. Second, the Army must have the capability to distribute this
information to soldiers who need it in order to maximize the utility of this technology.
This means that the Army might have to reengineer some of its processes, and ensure
there is connectivity between the platforms that pass this information. Finally, the Army
must address information overload. Many studies have suggested that the human brain
can only handle seven plus or minus two "chunks" of information at a time. Too much
information can increase, rather than decrease, the complexity of the system. The Army




The final way to obtain Requisite Variety is through variety catalysts. Variety
catalysts directly increase the number of COAs available to the commander. They include
changes in doctrine, training, organizations, leadership, and materiel. Figure 5-1 shows a
set number of COAs flowing out of the commander towards the enemy. Variety catalysts,
depicted as a magnifying glass, amplify the number and types of COAs and increase the
commander's variety. There are two ways to increase variety: quantitatively and
qualitatively.
a. Quantitative
Increasing quantitative variety means increasing the number of weapon
systems, soldiers, or units. This method relies on massive force structures to overwhelm
the enemy. It is not concerned with the types or kinds of weapon systems, but entirely on
numbers. By enlarging the number of weapon systems, variety expands due to the
increased number of combinations available to the commander. For example, if there are
three players on our basketball team then there are three different ways in which the ball
can travel:
1
between player one and player two,
between player one and player three, or
between player two and player three.
Now if we increase the number of players to four, then the number of different ways in
which the ball can travel is increased to six:
between player one and player two,
between player one and player three,
between player one and player four,
between player two and player three,
between player two and player four, or
between player three and player four.
Since we are comparing combinations, the ball traveling between players one and two, for example, is
equivalent to a single combination of players regardless of whether the ball specifically moves from player
one to two, or vice versa.
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It can be shown that the number of different combinations can be derived by the formula:
N(N-l)/2, where N is the number of players. Therefore, if there were six players then the
number of different combinations would equal fifteen: 6(5)/2 = 15.
So increasing the number of weapon systems or forces will increase the
commander's quantitative variety. While quantitative variety might seem attractive, there
are two distinct disadvantages. The first is cost Obviously, in today's environment, DoD
is in no position to be asking for enormous increases to the defense budget. However, the
researcher feels there are other opportunities to increase quantitative variety besides just
'buying more stuff', most notably, in the combat service support domain (reducing
turnaround time, mean time to repair, etc.). The second is that overwhelming numbers do
not directly translate to victory on the battlefield. In Chapter IV we saw that a basketball
team, despite having superior numbers, could not completely dominate the game because
they lacked the necessary defensive skills. In many instances, quality, not quantity, is the
dominant factor in the system. In fact, this is the very premise that the U.S. and coalition
forces used to win the Gulf War. Despite being hugely outnumbered in terms of weapon
systems and force strength, the U.S. defeated Iraq by emphasizing quality equipment,
soldiers, and training.
b. Qualitative
Qualitative variety concerns the amount of diversity in actions available to
control the system. For example, in order to increase qualitative variety, our basketball
team could recruit players with different skills. Some are quick and can shoot well from
the outside, while others are tall and very effective around the basket, and still others are
defensive specialists. A different option is to recruit players that are multi-talented. That
is, they shoot well from all distances, have speed, and are great defensively.
From a military perspective, there are many possible ways to build
qualitative variety into the force. One way is to build many different types of weapon
systems. This is analogous to recruiting players with different skills. The commander
could use these systems to attack the enemy from all the different spectrums of Force XXI
operations. Once again, cost could be a disadvantage to this option. Different weapon
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different inventories of spares, different mechanics, different ammunition, and different
soldier skills. The overall lifecycle costs of training soldiers and maintaining the
equipment have the potential to be relatively high. A derivative of this option is to have a
family of vehicles or transporters, but with different weapon systems. For instance, a
Bradley chassis can be used not only for an Infantry fighting vehicle, but also for an Air
Defense Artillery system. The Army currently does this with the Family of Medium
Tactical Vehicles. These trucks have a common chassis but different cargo variants:
materiel handling options, dump, tractor, wrecker, and vans.
Another way to build in qualitative variety is to build weapon systems that
are capable of performing many different missions. This is similar to recruiting a multi-
talented player. For example, one weapon super system could be developed to not only
shoot artillery fire, but also to destroy enemy aircraft and have enough mobility and direct
firepower to be used as an Infantry fighting vehicle. While this super system obviously
would give the commander more variety, this option would also have disadvantages.
Building complex weapon systems that have multi-capable roles is difficult and sometimes
costly. Not only does operation near the edge of the state-of-the art often greatly increase
cost and performance risk, but it can also have a seriously deleterious effect on reliability.
Norm Augustine, described this as the Law of Insatiable Appetites: "The last 10 percent
of the performance sought generates one-third of the cost and two-thirds of the
problems." He went on to write,
Soon DoD will build an aircraft that is so expensive that it will have to be
shared by the services. The Air Force will use it for three days, the Navy
for two, and the Army and Marines will use it half the time for the other
two days of the week. [Ref 3: p. 47]
Another disadvantage is the impact of destroying one of these super
systems. One artillery round or even a simple software virus could knock out a
considerable amount of firepower. It would be like our multi-talented basketball player
suffering an injury which prevents him from playing. Despite the potential disadvantages,
the Army should continue to search for ways to increase its qualitative variety.
68
There are other ways to increase the qualitative variety of the force besides
simply building new weapon systems. For example, through information dominance the
Army can appear to be in multiple places at once, or invisible to radar in other areas.
Through superior speed and mobility units can strike and move before detection or return
fire. By utilizing all spectrums of the battle space the Army can exponentially increase its
qualitative variety. Other areas such as doctrine, organizations, training, and soldiers all
contribute to the system. While they do not directly increase the number of COAs
available to the commander, they magnify the amount of variety by enabling the
commander to more efficiently use his resources. In commenting on the success of one of
the Army's latest warfighting experiments, General Dennis J. Reimer, emphasized the
importance of these variety enablers in remarks following the digitization AWE at Fort
Irwin in March 1997.
There is tremendous power associated with the cohesion that comes from
units working and training together. Clearly our doctrine will have to be
updated but the doctrine writers were out there in great numbers and I
think that is very doable. I also believe that our quality people are not only
challenged but turned on by the Force XXI process. I took away from this
exercise two clear impressions. First, the young men and women we are
getting in the force today can handle the equipment necessary for the
digitized battlefield and, secondly, I think we'll be able to retain them in
sufficient numbers because they are challenged by this experience and feel
good about the contributions they are making. For me, one of the biggest
challenges is in organization. We did things in this experiment, such as
provide the brigade commander with a brigade recon platoon and increased
the number of dismounts with a 2X9+5 configuration for Bradleys. We
also changed the [Combat Service Support] CSS structure significantly by,
among other things, moving a number of mechanics back to the [Forward
Support Battalion] FSB. Some of these things worked fine and others
need additional work. In our analysis I think we have to take a hard look
at this and see what we need to do... In my opinion, we have at least a 30%
increase in capabilities through situation awareness at the present time and
if we are able to develop it to its full potential it could be 50%-60%
increase. [Ref. 23]
4. Summary
Although variety is somewhat intangible, the conceptual framework depicted in
Figure 5-1 shows that there are many concrete ways to provide the commander with the
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necessary variety to dominate the battlefield. Environmental factors can regulate the
system and reduce the complexity, but these factors are out of the commander's
immediate control and make up part of a different system. The other ways to ensure
requisite variety that are within the commander's control are: information, quantitative
variety catalysts (numbers), and qualitative variety catalysts. Each of these have distinct
advantages and disadvantages. Optimally, a combination of all three alternatives should be
utilized in order to achieve synergistic effects.
This framework is a powerful tool. It provides an innovative way to determine
requirements using Requisite Variety as a basis. The people of the U.S. are looking for
ways to tighten the DoD budget, yet they still want a force that is capable of achieving a
quick, decisive victory. Given these conditions, Requisite Variety is a nascent
requirement This framework takes Ashby's Law, a relatively simple but underutilized
theory, and directly applies it to the military. It shows that complex systems, such as
battles and campaigns, can be dominated by having the necessary variety and the
framework provides the guidelines for understanding variety. Further, it provides a
common vocabulary to explain weapon requirements and the concepts of Force XXI to
both Congress and the warfighters on the ground. It helps explain the question, "Why?"
Why is the Army spending millions of dollars on AWEs and high-tech equipment to
digitize the battlefield? Why is the Army developing conceptual doctrine that seems more
suitable for Luke Skywalker than Sergeant York? Requisite Variety is one of the answers
and this framework facilitates its analysis and discussion.
The major weakness of this framework is that Requisite Variety is still hard to
quantify. In these times of downsizing, cost has become an important factor. Further
research is needed in this area. One angle that could be pursued is to run a series of
exercises using the variety of weapon systems as an independent variable. Based on the
outcomes of these experiments, a cost benefit analysis could be performed. This would be
an attempt to quantify the effectiveness of requisite variety. A few considerations must be
given to any research. First, there are going to be constraints involved. The researcher
must look at the constraints of the problem, whether they be money, time, or some other
factor Second, the system of which DoD is part is continually changing (threat, budget,
70
etc.). Nonetheless, the theory of Requisite Variety can be useful. The Requisite Variety
in a sense, is similar to an insurance policy. It can provide the framework for what the
Army is able to do based on the variety of options. This aspect could be very useful in
quadrennial or bottom up reviews. A third consideration is that the U.S. is in a unique
situation with respect to world power. In terms of game theory, the U.S. is clearly in a
position of leader and if other countries want to follow then they can. This is fine as long
as the U.S. considers what long term effects current decisions have on other countries
(e.g., what signals are we sending when we set force structures and equipment levels).
Finally, any decisions must have the support of both the executive and legislative branches
of our Government.
Given these considerations, the framework explained above provides a very
powerful tool from which to launch further research in order to quantify the factor of
Requisite Variety. However, due to the exponential number of permutations and
combinations of weapon systems and force structures, these studies will be challenging
and it might take years of analysis to obtain significant results. The researcher believes
that the framework, although intangible in nature, can provide a way for the Army to
analyze requirements and prioritize weapon systems given the current global conditions.
C. PRIORITIZING WEAPON SYSTEMS
As covered in the previous section of this study, the theory of Requisite Variety
provides three ways to increase the commander's ability to dominate the battlefield:
increase the quantitative variety (number of forces and weapon systems), increase the
qualitative variety (different types of weapon systems), and use information to reduce the
uncertainty and regulate the system. Optimally, a combination of all three alternatives
should be utilized in order to achieve synergistic effects. However, given the current
global environment and budgetary constraints, the question remains: how can we
prioritize what types ofweapon systems to develop and procure?
Given the current push to balance the federal budget and the trend for right-sizing
DoD, the first option, increasing quantitative variety does not seem feasible. The
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researcher posits that of the other two alternatives, the Army should focus its short term
efforts on acquiring C-^I and mobility assets. The reason for this assertion is twofold.
First, the technology currently available today can give the Army tremendous capability to
increase information sharing and mobility at a minimal acquisition cost. Second, the
characteristics of Force XXI operations are knowledge-based concepts which leverage
common situational awareness to achieve combat power. The following paragraphs
provide a discussion of this reasoning.
Many studies have documented the technical explosion occurring throughout the
world. The top of the line, high speed computer that is bought today may be antiquated,
slow, and out-of-date by the year's end. The U.S. has the capability to field high-tech,
information gathering systems without the high cost of research and development. This
fact is captured in the following paragraph from TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5:
The manner of conducting joint land operations does not rely for its
existence solely upon future technologies. Force XXI operations are
possible with existing technologies; we are simply not yet sufficiently
tactically adaptable nor have we changed some battle processes to take full
advantage of such versatility...Our weapons can strike anywhere in our
battlespace, but we cannot fully control them or sense their effects.
Intelligence systems can provide detailed images, yet the full
synchronization of all this capability is not realized. Evolving information
technologies will almost undoubtedly unlock the full potential of Force
XXI operations... This ongoing doctrinal development will place the Army
in the lead of the revolution in military affairs. [Ref 29: p. 3-20]
This suggests that the Army can leverage existing technologies of C^I and mobility
assets at relatively minimal costs by changing doctrine, tactics, and processes on the
battlefield. This was one of the driving factors for the genesis of Force XXI operations.
In examining the characteristics of these operations (multi-dimensional, precise, non-
linear, distributed, simultaneous, and integrated), one can see that the Army intends to
fully exploit the principle of economy of force through the use of information.
Economy of force rightly means, not a mere husbanding of one's resources
in manpower, but the employment of one's force, both weapons and men,
in accordance with economic laws, so as to yield the highest possible
dividend of success in proportion to the expenditure of strength. Economy
of force is the supreme law of successful war. [Ref. 1 7]
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The digital battlefield is all about economy of force. The efficiency and precision
gained by digital situational awareness produce opportunities to mass the effects of
combat power as never done before. As seen in the previous chapter we cannot destroy
the enemy's combat power (variety), nor can we create more combat power by simply
gathering more battlefield information. Rather, we can stretch the potential combat power
of our force by employing assets only where and when they are needed to accomplish
tactical objectives. When we increase the force's awareness by providing relevant
battlefield information, we reduce the effort it must exert on active security measures
necessitated by uncertainty. Any combat unit has only a.finite amount of time and energy
available to it. Tactical units can expend time and energy by combat action, security
activities or in non-combat activities including refueling, rearming, maintaining, planning,
rehearsing, and resting. All of these activities are performed more efficiently and
effectively when the burden of active security measures is reduced.
In order to explain how information enables us to do this, the researcher now
introduces a central concept that emerges from Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety, that
information can reduce uncertainty and help regulate the system. The researcher will call
this concept the Time-Information Differential, or Delta TI (dTI).
It takes a certain amount of time (T) to maneuver a force from one point to
another. We will assume that these points are tactical objectives, the accomplishment of
which have decisive effects upon the enemy. Our goal is to diminish our units' time and
combat power spent on non-objective oriented activities. Rather, we would like to have
our units profitably engaged in activities directly related to decisive missions.
In order to accomplish this, we need information (I) that gives us sufficient time to
maneuver our unit so that we arrive at precise positions of advantage in time to
accomplish specified tasks. This information has a time component, which we will call
(TI), which represents how much time our information gives us to act. For example, if
our information determines an enemy unit five hours away from points at which we want
to strike him, then we have five hours to take action. Further, if our information system
indicates that an enemy unit cannot physically move to certain points of the battlefield,
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then our equation would be TI = infinity, which may mean it is tactically insignificant and
we would not commit our forces there in response.
So the question is, is TI greater than the time (T) required to maneuver forces to
positions of advantage? That is essentially what battle commanders need to know when
considering maneuver options and schemes. If TI - T is a positive number, in other words,
dTI > 0, then we have the opportunity to maneuver our force in time to dominate the
physical battle space. If however, dTI < 0, then we cannot maneuver our unit in time
based on the available information we have, so perhaps we need to reposition ourselves
closer to our critical points or task another unit to conduct the action.
The researcher postulates two methods of increasing the time-information
differential to create advantageous battlefield conditions suited for initiative. The first
method is to increase our information of the tactical situation. The more relevant combat
knowledge one possesses of the situation, the more options can be generated or exploited.
For example, this can be done by tasking all-source intelligence systems and employing
organic or supporting sensors, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), aerial and
ground reconnaissance. Another method is to decrease time (T) by designing faster units,
moving units closer to where we might need them, or employing airlift, sealift or heavy
ground transport assets to accelerate movement. Ideally we perform both methods and
increase dTI by manipulating both TI and T variables simultaneously. The Army can
leverage existing technologies of C-^I and mobility assets at relatively minimal costs by
changing doctrine, tactics, and processes on the battlefield.
Historically, dTI has almost always been less than 0. Operational mobility has
never matched the capability of intelligence to tell us what the enemy is trying to do.
Wellington and Napoleon had intelligence that moved at the speed of horses and faced
armies with approximately that same speed. Thus dTI was virtually nonexistent. More
recently we have had access to better aerial and space-orbital reconnaissance, but the
speed of dissemination of this material to field commanders limited its usefulness. Only
now with software intensive systems are we achieving the means of delivering theater and
national-level quality intelligence to tactical commanders. This means we are finally
envisioning a battlefield where we expect dTI to be greater than on a routine basis.
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Figure 5-2 shows the historical evolution of dTI in the U.S. military. During the
Civil War, the primary means of passing information was the courier and telegraph. This
allowed the commander to orient forces in days, decide on a COA within weeks, and it
took months to execute this plan. During WWI, radio and wire were
Figure 5-2. Historical Evolution of dTI
the available means of communication, with orientation of forces within hours, decisions in
days, and execution within a week. Now, consider General Norman Schwarzkopf s
capabilities during the Gulf War. He could observe in near real time, orient in minutes,
decide in hours, and act the same day. Given the current budgetary constraints, global
environment, and using the concept of the time-information differential, the researcher
concludes the Army should focus its short term acquisition efforts on C->I and mobility
assets.
This prioritization covers all spectrums of the threat (phenomena through complex,
adaptive armies) discussed in Chapter III. However, it is sensitive to the proliferation of
weapons and technology. For example, if an emerging military power suddenly develops a
new armor-piercing tank round, then the Army must shift its priorities to some kind of
new protective armor to counter this threat. Therefore, the prioritization of weapon
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systems is an iterative process which requires intelligence, feedback, and continual
updating.
In summary, the basis for this prioritization is the theory of Requisite Variety: only
variety can destroy variety. Information reduces the uncertainty in the system, while
mobility and situational awareness act as catalysts to increase the variety of friendly forces.
Modernization of action (weapon) systems can further increase our variety. However,
given the current financial health of the defense environment and using cost as an
independent variable, this option does not seem prudent in the short term. This does not
mean we should build all intelligence systems and no action systems. For then, we would
be "putting all of our eggs in the same basket" much the same as our uninformed
basketball coach did with his players. The bottom line is given current financial
constraints, short term efforts should focus on C^I and mobility systems. Concurrently,
long term efforts should focus on parallel processes of prototyping action systems. These
areas provide the best cost/benefit ratio for building a bridge to the 21st Century.
By using our basketball analogy we can come to the same conclusion. If the white
team can continue to gain information on the red team (in the previous chapter this was
accomplished by the assistant coach eavesdropping on the opposing team during a time
out), the white team can gain a significant advantage without spending much money on
additional players. Similarly, if all the players increase their mobility and quickness, they
can further exploit this gained information by proactively disrupting the red team's game
plan. This advantage, however, will not last indefinitely. Sooner or later, the red team
will catch on to this strategy and counteract it by denying the assistant coach's access to
their time outs or by drawing up "fake" or deceptive plays. Therefore, the white team
should also take a long term perspective such as continually developing their skills or
acquiring a quality, versatile player (a Michael Jordan perhaps).
D. IMPACT ON OTHER SERVICES
The impact of these findings on other Services is that they all apply exactly the
same. To understand this we must first understand how the other Services fit into the
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model of our system. Earlier in this chapter the researcher introduced a simple model in
which a commander was responsible for controlling a system (Figure 5-1) The model
was simplified by assuming that all influences on the enemy were channeled through a
single input and all the effects it exerts were channeled into a single output. A closed loop
was thereby artificially created. In reality, there are outside factors that influence this
system which are sometimes out of the immediate control of the commander. For
example, changes in the NMS or DPG help regulate the system by reducing the
proliferation of variety and complexity. Other factors include higher headquarters, terrain,
weather, other units, other enemy units, and other Services. When examined from a
different, more macro paradigm, these factors form the environment of a larger system
which encompasses the model of our commander. Figure 5-3 shows that the commander
is actually a subsystem of his higher headquarters control. Similarly, the enemy is a
subsystem of its parent organization. Thus, a model of the larger system which utilizes the
same closed loop interactions is formed.
Following the same logic, where each commander (control) is a subsystem of a
parent system and each enemy (situation) is a subsystem of a parent system, forms a series















Source: Modified from Ref. 4.
Figure 5-3. Hierarchy of Systems
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system such as the one introduced in Chapter IV. Therefore, Ashby's theory of Requisite
Variety can be used to study each iteration of the models and the findings presented in this
study is valid for each individual level.
For instance, at the highest level there is the National Command Authority (NCA)
which seeks to control the system. The enemy, or situation, in this context encompasses
the entire threat spectrum that was described in Chapter II. As a review, during the Cold
War the U.S. faced a single, prescriptive threat. Today U.S. military forces are being
projected to address a wider variety of objectives including peacekeeping, nation building,
and humanitarian operations. Therefore, in order to completely control the system the
NCA must have a variety of options that is greater than or equal to the variety of
objectives. These options include all Services and must encompass all the missions for
which U.S. forces must project power to further national interests. Joint warfare, using
elements of the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marines, significantly increases the qualitative
variety available to the NCA. Increasing the qualitative variety of control responses is an
excellent way to dominate the system and is a driving force behind using Joint forces at all
levels of conflict.
So we see that Ashby's theory of Requisite Variety is valid not only at the Army
level, but at all levels of conflict. But what about the prioritization of weapon systems?
Do the findings in this study for the Army apply at the national level? The researcher
believes the answer to this question is yes. The options available at the NCA level include
international policy as well as military power. The NCA clearly wants effective options to
maximize political leverage while minimizing the exposure of U.S. troops and limiting
collateral damage. Since political leverage is closely related to the speed of involvement,
the effectiveness of our early warning systems is critical to increasing our leverage.
Timely and accurate information can facilitate the identification of potential crisis before
they reach critical mass and assist in the decision process on how best to ensure that
American interests are not only protected but enhanced. Again, this is primarily a question
of process. The technology has long been available for gathering a wealth of information
on unambiguous actions such as troop movements. But the U.S. still lacks the ability to
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fuse disparate inputs to sort out the meaning to warnings and concealed intentions of an
adversary.
So we see that the prioritization of systems is the same at the national level as for
the Army. Similarly, the U.S. must not only look at the short term objectives. Long term
objectives must include all aspects of the model: information, qualitative variety, and
quantitative variety.
E. CONCLUSION
This chapter directly applied Ashby's theory of Requisite Variety to the military. It
provided a conceptual framework for using variety as a factor when determining
requirements for the future forces of the U.S. Army. Although variety is somewhat
intangible, the framework revealed concrete ways to provide the commander with the
necessary variety to dominate the battlefield: through regulation, information, quantitative
variety catalysts (numbers and force strengths), and qualitative variety catalysts (different
types of COAs). The chapter also suggested that given the current budgetary constraints
and the global world environment, the Army should focus its short term material
acquisitions on C-^I and mobility assets. By applying the conceptual framework to the
concepts of Force XXI operations, the researcher developed the Time-Information
Differential. Based on this concept the Army will gain the most utility while at the same
time minimizing its costs by prioritizing its short term efforts on these assets. However, to
achieve synergistic results, the Army should concurrently research other types of weapon
systems using the framework as a guide. Finally, the chapter showed that the framework
and concepts of Requisite Variety are valid for other Services and DoD as a whole.
The next chapter presents an AWE conducted at U.S. Army Armor Center at Fort
Knox, KY. The researcher applies the framework to the experiment and examines the
validity and functionality of the findings that this study has yielded.
79
80
VI. EXAMINATION OF THE FRAMEWORK
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the conceptual framework developed in the previous
chapter by applying it to an AWE conducted by TRADOC from July through December of
1995. The focus is to analyze the major findings of the exercise from the perspective of
the Requisite Variety framework. These findings (not all-inclusive) were derived from the
exercise documents, personal interviews with exercise personnel, and the author's own
observations from participation in the actual conduct of the exercise.
The first section of this chapter covers the background of the exercise. It provides
a description of the purpose, participants, and conduct of the exercise, along with a brief
summary of the scenario. The next section examines the utility of the conceptual
framework developed in Chapter V by analyzing the compelling innovations derived from
the exercise with respect to Requisite Variety.
B. BACKGROUND
1. Conduct of the Exercise
The exercise, conducted from JUL-DEC 1995, was a General Officer Working
Group project sponsored by TRADOC. The goal of this "sand table exercise" was to
determine Force XXI requirements, structure, and conceptual doctrine for use in follow-
on live and virtual exercises. The researcher chose this particular exercise because it
served as the foundation for many TRADOC Force XXI conceptual doctrine publications
and research studies. For all practical purposes, it was the genesis of the Army's new
Requirements Determination process. The concepts in TRADOC PAM 525-5, described
in earlier chapters of this study, served as the basis for this exercise. The objective of the
exercise was to build upon these concepts and produce:
• a Division Operations and Organization manual for Force XXI units.
• warfighting tasks and TTP for Force XXI units, and
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• a How To Fight manual for the Experimental Force (EXFOR).
[ NOTE: The EXFOR is a Force XXI equipped division located at Fort Hood, TX. The
EXFOR is the unit that participates in the "digital" NTC rotations and other AWEs to test
new concepts and equipment.]
A major regional contingency set in the 21st Century served as the scenario for this
exercise. The friendly forces consisted of a Force XXI designed and equipped division.
This notional division was assigned the dominant mission of the Corps' decisive operation.
The Commandant of each branch school was assigned the task of developing concepts for
a specific Pattern of Operation. For example, the Commandants of the Armor and
Infantry schools were responsible for developing a concept of operation for the Decisive
Operation phase of the Force XXI Division Operations Plan. The Commandant of the
Field Artillery school was responsible for developing concepts for the Shape the
Battlespace phase of the operation. A series of "sand table" exercises involving all of the
Commandants were used to discuss, test, examine, and build upon the concepts developed
by each of the branch schools.
The outcome of the battle (i.e., who won or lost) was not as important as the
concepts developed during the exercise. The Army wanted to start answering the How
and Why questions for this revolution in military affairs. Therefore, the focus of this study
is on the compelling innovations that were derived during the conduct of the exercise. To
better understand the basis for these innovations, the next section of this chapter provides
a brief description of the scenario used for the exercise.
2. Scenario
This exercise was geographically set on the fictitious island continent of Galacia in
the Atlantic Ocean. Galacia is actually parts of Europe divided into five different
countries. This allowed the Working Group to use existing maps and weather conditions
for the planning and conduct of the exercise. Figure 6-1 shows the partitioning of Galacia:
• Burgundy: the primary friendly force of this scenario and an ally of the U.S.,
incorporates portions of France.















Figure 6-1. Scenario Map
• Saxony: the primary hostile force in this scenario, covers portions of Germany
and Eastern France.
• Westphalia: another hostile force that supports Saxony, incorporates Northern
Germany and Denmark.
• Sardinia: a neutral force in this scenario, covers Southern Germany, Austria,
and portions of Italy.
a. History
This section provides a brief history of what led to the scenario conflict.
Appendix B: AWE ROAD TO WAR, provides a complete listing of the events that led to
the conflict. The nation of Burgundy was established by the Allied Powers following
World War II as a constitutional monarchy. The nation encompassed the original country
of Burgundy in the south, and an industrial region annexed from Saxony as reparations
following World War II. The royal family was well established in pre-war Burgundy, and
was highly involved in the partisan effort during the war. During the Cold War era, the
tension increased between Burgundy and Saxony. The monarchy of Burgundy crumbled
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as inter-party rivalries spurred violence and destabilized the government. The countries of
Saxony and Westphalia formed an alliance in 1994 and now threaten to invade Burgundy
to reclaim "their rightful" land and resources.
The U.S. deems the escalating conflict on the island continent of Galacia a
direct threat to the following vital interests:
• Mercia and Burgundy, traditionally staunch U.S. allies, are directly threatened.
• Vital European sea lanes are at risk should Saxony and Westphalia control the
entire island.
• Control of recently discovered undersea oil fields.
The NCA decides to commit U.S. military forces, under United Nations
Charter, as part of a multinational force to conduct combat operations to deter invasion
while supporting diplomatic efforts to terminate the conflict. The military objective is to
project forces into theater to deter a Saxon/Westphalian Alliance attack; should deterrence
fail, conduct offensive operations to rapidly destroy attacking forces. End state is
deterrence of attack or the destruction of all enemy offensive capabilities and the
restoration of Burgundian territorial sovereignty.
b. Force Comparisons
The focus of General Officer Working Group was on the 25th Division
which was part of the Combined Joint Task Force. It was a Force XXI equipped unit with
a mission to attack and destroy the follow-on divisions of the combined Saxon/Westphalia
forces. The immediate enemy forces consisted of a Tank Division with a high-
technological capacity of weapon systems and a Motorized Rifle Division with a mid-
technological capacity of weapon systems. Figure 6-2 shows a comparison of the major
weapon systems for each unit. It is interesting to note that the 25th Division was
outnumbered in almost all weapon system categories. To overcome this deficiency in
quantitative variety, the Working Group had to be very innovative in developing the
concept of operations for this scenario. With this as a background, the next section of this
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Weapon Systems 25th FXXI Div 3rdMRD 15th Tank Div











































































Figure 6-2. Force Comparisons
chapter examines the compelling innovations that were derived from the exercise with
respect to the conceptual framework for Requisite Variety.
C. EXAMINATION OF KEY FINDINGS
1. The Impact of Requisite Variety
One of the most significant findings of this exercise is: "The decisive force must
be capable of producing, integrating and orchestrating all of the required effects
determined to cause decision." [Ref 1: p. 2] The group discovered that the 25th Force
XXI Division was not the decisive force within this scenario. The decisive action for this
conflict was defined as the destruction of the enemy's 1st Combined Arms Army. Based
on the military and strategic end states, and the established success criteria, the 10th U.S.
Corps (25th Division's Higher Headquarters) was the force capable of performing this
decisive action. However, the group noted that within the 10th U.S. Corps' decisive
operation, the 25th Force XXI Division performed the dominant action, relative to all
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other actions within the Corps, that is intended to cause terminal or culminating effects
upon the enemy.
From the perspective of the Requisite Variety framework, the 25th Force XXI
Division did not have the Requisite Variety needed in order to dominate, or control, the
situation. The General Officer Working Group realized that despite having the capability
to significantly contribute to the operation, it was their higher headquarters (10th Corps)
that possessed the Requisite Variety to perform culminating actions. This circumstance
illustrates the Hierarchy of Systems explained in Chapter V and depicted in Figure 5-3.
The 25th Force XXI Division was merely a subsystem of the parent system, and was not
capable of totally controlling the situation.
The implications of this finding are either the Corps should be the focus of the
operation, or the Army should increase the variety of the Division. The General Officer
Working Group recommended increasing the variety of the Division through a modular
organizational design and through streamlined doctrine and tactics. There were two main
reasons for these recommendations. First, the Division did not possess assured
capabilities required to dominate the battlefield. They chose the word "assured" because
many of the needed assets were not organic to the Division. Rather, the needed assets
belonged to Corps and the Division commander did not have control of them. Two
examples of this are mobility assets for the Light Brigade and air defense assets. The ideal
plan of attack included the use of light infantry in combination with armor forces.
However, the Division lacked the air-lift or truck capability needed to fully exploit this
option. This mobility differential made it difficult to synchronize infantry with armor, and
left infantrymen vulnerable to counter-attacks with no capability for self-extraction.
Additionally, the extended range of the operation left the Division vulnerable to air attacks
and surveillance by UAVs. Without sufficient dedicated air defense assets, the enemy
could exploit this weakness. In other words, if the enemy commander chose this COA,
the friendly commander did not have the requisite variety to control the situation.
The second reason why the Division was not conducting a decisive operation was
that the Corps operation plan prescribed tasks that limited how the 25th Force XXI
Division intended to fight. For example:
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• Corps planned fire strikes on the 1 5TD and 3MRD prior to the 25th Division
contact with the enemy.
• Corps emplaced dynamic obstacles to fix the 15TD and 3MRD.
• Corps assigned an Aviation Brigade to attack the lead regiments of the 15TD
and 3MRD
These examples show that while environmental regulation can be used to reduce
the complexity of the situation, it also can have the opposite effect. In this case, the
environmental regulation reduced the variety of friendly COAs and limited the options
available to the friendly commander.
This finding has a significant impact on our Conceptual Framework for Providing
Requisite Variety. The framework highlighted three ways to provide commanders the
necessary variety with which to dominate the enemy: through regulation, information, and
variety catalysts. The warfighting exercise illustrates that these methods must be used
correctly in order to achieve the desired result. Further, the enemy commander can, and
most likely will, use these methods to increase his variety. For example, information
dominance can range from information supremacy to information inferiority. It can
change over space and time, and it also may vary by echelon. Therefore, achieving a
positive Time-Information Differential is not something that the Army can simply design
into its force structure and modernization plans. It must be fought for and won through a
deliberate process that is synchronized with the other methods of achieving Requisite
Variety.
2. The Increasing Complexity of Force XXI Operations
Another significant finding derived from the exercise is that full dimensional
operations meld strategic, operational and tactical levels; future Force XXI Operations
have the possibility of eliminating any distinction between the levels. This was an
important realization during the exercise, because the strategic objective was to restore the
control of a country that had been taken over by a hostile enemy. In the scenario, total
destruction of the enemy was not an option unless the U.S. wanted to maintain a long-
term presence in the area to restore the infrastructure (roads, water sources, buildings,
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etc.). The friendly commander at the tactical level must understand what conditions must
be set in order to achieve strategic objectives. Figure 6-3, illustrates this relationship.










































Source: Author and the Advanced Warfighting Workgroup, FT Knox, KY, 1995
Figure 6-3. Force XXI Operations
Before executing the patterns of operations, the friendly commander must first
utilize backwards planning to ensure that strategic objectives are met, and what post
conflict operations are needed in order to facilitate attaining these objectives. The
commander must also understand the criteria for transitioning from conflict termination to
post conflict operations.
This is another illustration of how environmental regulation affects the system.
The General Officer Working Group discovered that the dramatic increase of speed,
optempo, and distance generated by Force XXI Operations required tactical commanders
to fully understand the strategic objectives. In the exercise, the division commander
wanted to strike the enemy and his supporting structure in a simultaneous manner.
Therefore, the enemy would be isolated from its support structure while it was getting
slammed by friendly maneuver forces. The tactical commander could not execute these
actions in isolation, however. Many key targets had (some kind of) strategic importance.
For example, an airfield, segments of a highway, water facilities, and part of one city were
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all priority targets that could not be executed (i.e. destroyed) because of strategic
objectives. These objectives specified a quick, decisive victory, with minimal casualties
and minimal destruction of local infrastructure. The goal was to restore control of the
country, which meant the local infrastructure could not be totally destroyed. This not only
decreased the tactical commander's qualitative variety, but it made the operation much
more complex. Friendly forces could not simply deploy massive air strikes to totally
destroy key targets, because of the many restrictions. The commander had to
meticulously plan operations to dominate his opponent
Given the future threat spectrum and the prevalence of peace enforcement
objectives of the U.S., the researcher feels that this trend towards melding the levels of
war will continue in the 21st Century. Commanders at lower levels will be called upon to
execute missions that are currently being handled by Corps. The commanders will be
responsible for understanding and achieving strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.
The result is the system these commanders must control becomes increasingly more
complex and will possess more variety. To facilitate success, these commanders must be
armed with the requisite weapon systems and soldiers in order to control the system. This
places even greater importance on understanding and correctly utilizing the framework for
providing Requisite Variety.
3. Application of Information and Variety Catalysts
So far the analysis of this exercise has demonstrated that units that lack Requisite
Variety cannot truly conduct Decisive Operations and that environmental regulation can
increase the complexity of the system. To overcome these facts, the General Officer
Working Group had to come up with some innovative ways to defeat the enemy. The
researcher found that the group used both information and variety catalysts in order to
control the system.
Information was used to both decrease the uncertainty of enemy actions and
increase the situational awareness of friendly units. The concept of the operation portion
of the 25th Division's Operations Plan illustrates the emphasis the group placed on
information.
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The Force XXI Division defeats or destroys the enemy by a combination of
moving and striking. After crossing points of departure, the division uses
dispersed formations to maneuver to close with the enemy from multiple
points of contact. The division maneuvers to positions of advantage or
appears from an unexpected direction to simultaneously strike the enemy
with direct and indirect fires to destroy him. The division moves dispersed
and with stealth so as to mask its intentions from enemy observers.
Battalion-size units utilize dispersed formation and routes to maneuver,
using the digital battle command system to maintain situation awareness
and control. Lethal fires are used to destroy specific enemy capabilities
such as reconnaissance which allows the division to retain the element of
surprise and sets the conditions for success. [Ref 1 : p. 4]
The group made exhaustive efforts to maintain good intelligence on the enemy
while maximizing stealth techniques to deny the enemy the true intentions of the friendly
forces. However, they realized that information dominance is a temporary condition
achievable only through a deliberate process. In order to take full advantage of these
windows of information dominance they emphasized two features that are essential to the
process. First, the commander must identify critical information requirements to control
information, lest it will dominate him. Second, the time devoted to the tactical decision-
making process and execution must be dramatically compressed. These "features" are
identical to the information considerations identified in the conceptual framework: the
Army must address information overload and the Army might have to reengineer some of
its processes.
In addition to information dominance, the General Officer Working Group placed
great emphasis on increasing the different COAs to defeat the enemy (i.e., qualitative
variety). Listed below are some the compelling innovations developed over the course of
the exercise. They cover the myriad aspects of future forces: system requirements,
organization, doctrine, tactics, and techniques. However, they all have one thing in
common: providing the commander the Requisite Variety to control the situation.
• Decisive Operations require the precise integration and application of combat
power and combat multipliers throughout the enemy formation in depth—and in all
dimensions to quickly defeat him.
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• Overwhelming combat power is relative to the local conditions at the multiple
points of contact—not a global correlation of forces.
• Overwhelming combat power can be achieved by employing deep strikes,
maneuver, air mobile operations, special operation forces, and electronic warfare in an
integrated fashion.
• Sequential, nested, tactical planning must change to reduce the amount of
prescriptive tasks (environmental regulation) placed upon subordinate units that constrain
the intellectual development of concepts of operation and the freedom to employ every
tool at the commanders' disposal for maneuver—this includes planning and executing
operations with few restrictive control measures and boundaries.
• The employment of air assault forces to attack and control enemy rear areas.
• The employment of dynamic autonomous obstacles to achieve countermobility
and psychological effects.
• Combat service support activities on the move.
• Mounted attack of mobile enemy forces that strike concentrated, moving forces
without fixing.
• Force oriented missions for attack helicopter units to take advantage of their
mobility.
• Planning and conducting non-linear egress out of theater to eliminate the
requirement to reverse the onward movement cycle upon conflict termination.
• Modular organizational designs that allow force tailoring based on METT-T for
versatility.
• Shaping the battlespace by influencing (i.e., destroy, defeat, delay, divert, deny,
deceive, limit or attrit) an enemy capability, force or decision.
• Shaping all dimensions of the battlespace: depth, width, height, time, the
electro-magnetic spectrum and the human dimension.
• Engaging the enemy with lethal and non-lethal fires from dispersed locations.
As shown above, the General Officer Working Group developed many different
ways to increase the amount of variety within their control subsystem. However, among
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the disparate array of ideas, ran two common themes that continued throughout the
exercise. First, the group made maximum use of the Time-Information Differential. This
is obvious from the amount of time and effort spent on obtaining information dominance,
and once this dominance was achieved, putting it to good use. The group continually
took advantage of information superiority to proactively shape the battlespace. They did
this through the use of attack helicopters, and other highly mobile assets. Additionally,
they utilized long-range precision strike munitions to "reach out and touch the enemy."
This introduces another dimension to the author's Time-Information Differential. As a
review, the author postulated two methods of increasing dTI: through information and
mobility. The results of the exercise shows that long-range precision strike munitions can
also increase dTI by decreasing the time it takes units to engage the enemy.
The second general observation is there was an interesting metamorphosis in the
attitudes of the individual group members. Initially, each branch commandant took a very
parochial view towards the weapon systems. Each commandant seemed to view the
exercise as a "turf battle," or an opportunity justify their weapon systems concepts.
However, as the exercise continued, the group members realized that each branch added
some kind of value to the operation. They realized that in order to control the enemy who
had superior numbers (quantitative variety) they had to have the flexibility to utilize a
number of different options (i.e., they had to have qualitative variety). Therefore, the
attitudes changed and a more teaming effort formed.
D. SUMMARY
The AWE validated many aspects of the Conceptual Framework for Providing
Requisite Variety. Overall, the General Officer Working Group recognized that without
Requisite Variety, the Force XXI Division could not conduct Decisive Operations. That
is, they could not totally dominate the battlefield without the necessary means to do so
within the control system. The lack of Requisite Variety in this exercise was primarily
caused by two reasons. First the Force XXI Division did not have the "assured"
capabilities required for the operation. That is, they lacked sufficient qualitative variety.
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Second, the environmental regulation imposed by higher headquarters limited the number
ofCOAs available to the Division.
The exercise also suggests that as the capabilities of future forces increase, the
forces will be called upon to take on more responsibility. Commanders at the tactical level
will have to understand and execute operations in order to achieve strategic objectives.
This melding of levels of war increases the complexity of the system. It represents an
implosion of the series of concentric rectangles that represented the parent and subsystems
in our model, and places an even greater importance on the need for our forces to have
Requisite Variety.
Next, the exercise demonstrated that information, environmental regulation, and
variety catalysts are all valid ways to increase the commanders' options on the battlefield.
However, these methods to increase variety must be used correctly and in an integrated
fashion to achieve maximum results. Two prime examples illustrated in the exercise
involved environmental regulation and information. Environmental regulation in the
exercise decreased the friendly commanders' options, and therefore, increased instead of
reduced the complexity of the system. The group of General Officers deemed this point as
so significant that one of their key findings was that higher headquarters must reduce the
amount of prescriptive tasks dictated to subordinate units. Information dominance was a
valued commodity that had to be planned for and efficiently utilized to be effective.
Finally, the exercise demonstrated the importance of qualitative variety. The
group devised many different ways to increase their variety. One significant method was
maximizing the Time-Information Differential which the author introduced in Chapter V.
The group made continual efforts to maintain information superiority, and utilized highly
mobile assets to decrease the time it takes to proactively influence the battle. In addition,
the group supplemented the dTI concept through the use of long-range, precision strike
munitions which further decreased the time to shape the battlespace.
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VH. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The decade of the 90's has been one of change for the U.S. Army. There is no
longer a single, dominant threat such as the former Soviet Union. Instead, there is an
increased chance of our forces deploying to a number of limited regional conflicts. As one
Task Force Commander states,
Operations other than war, low-intensity conflict, peacekeeping,
peacemaking, peace enforcement—by whatever name, such missions are
performed more frequently by a post Cold War Army. As vital as these
are, the Army's primary mission remains to fight and win the nation's wars.
[Ref 19]
The result is that the future forces of the U.S. face a great variety of threats in a global
environment with unprecedented complexities.
The American public demands a quick, decisive victory with minimal casualties. In
order to accomplish this, the Army must have the capability to totally dominate and
control the enemy. Requisite Variety is essential to this mission. This research shows that
in order to control such complex systems, the friendly commander must have a variety of
options. In fact, to totally dominate the battlefield, the variety of COAs available to the
friendly commander must be greater than or equal to that of the enemy. However,
concurrent with the dramatic changes in the global environment, the U.S. has significantly
decreased defense spending. The competition for these dwindling defense dollars has
increased the Army's risk of misallocating its scarce resources to a few "brilliant" systems
without regard to the factor of variety.
Figure 7- 1 shows how this study attacks this problem. It begins with an anlysis of
the Army's Requirements Determination Process and Force XXI Operations with respect
to variety and resource allocation. Next the author reviews the theory of Requisite
Variety and develops a conceptual framework for its military application. The framework
is examined through an AWE and the author presents findings derived from the






















Figure 7-1. Road Map to the Study
1. Requirements Determination Process
In order to overcome the complexities of the 21st Century, the Army has
implemented a new Requirements Determination process and developed unique concepts
for land combat called Force XXI Operations. The new Requirements Determination
process investigates the slew of Science and Technology opportunities in addition to
meeting operational deficiencies identified through a Mission Area Analysis. The process
begins with the TRADOC commander's vision which is translated into desired Future
Operational Capabilities and delegated to the branch schools and battle labs. The branch
schools utilize Integrated Concept Teams to transform these desired capabilities into
solutions across the domains of doctrine, training, leader development, organization,
materiel, and soldiers. These solutions are examined and tested through live, virtual, and
conceptual warfighting experiments. Feedback from these experiments funnels back into
the process in order to further define the product until a requirement is determined. The
process is designed to be flexible. The Integrated Concept Teams include personnel from
a wide spectrum of disciplines and have the potential to facilitate a smooth transition to
Integrated Product Teams should a materiel need be identified. However, including a
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variety of views in the process of determining requirements does not translate to variety in
our future forces. The Army does not directly address variety as a factor in the process.
They have no means to evaluate the need for variety and therefore, have no instrument for
prioritizing requirements with variety as a basis.
2. Force XXI Operations
In contrast, Force XXI Operations, the Army's operational land concept for the
2 1 st Century, make numerous direct and indirect references to the need for variety in our
forces. These operations are knowledge-based which exploit information technology and
leverage other technological opportunities to achieve a new level of effectiveness in joint
warfighting. They call for soldiers to be versatile, capable of performing a number of
different missions. They emphasize multi-dimensionsal operations — attacking the enemy
across myriad spectrums, and decisive operations — causing the enemy to do our will.
These features, along with other Force XXI concepts described in Chapter III of this
study, require commanders on the ground be fully equipped with a variety of weapon
systems. However, Force XXI Operations have been criticized by some who believe that
the conceptual doctrine is too abstract, pushing the level of "Star Wars." In addition, the
Army has not adequately explained their vision to Congress, and as a result, has received
much criticism on costly warfighting experiments.
3. Requisite Variety
This research provides a conceptual framework that helps explain aspects of Force
XXI Operations and innovates the Requirements Determination process by utilizing
variety as a factor. It is based on the theory of Requisite Variety developed by cybertician
Ross Ashby. Ashby postulated the theory while studying the dynamics of complex
systems. He observed that as systems become more complex, the variety within the
system proliferates. He found that in order to command these systems, the variety in the
control mechanism must be equal to, or greater than, the variety within the system itself.
In Ashby' s words, "Only variety can destroy variety." [Ref. 2: p. 208] This theory has a
direct military application where the commander is the control mechanism and the enemy
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is the subsytem which proliferates variety. From this paradigm, in order to dominate the
enemy, it is necessary for the commander to have at least as many different options as are
available to his enemy. A careful distinction must be made between pure numbers and the
different types of options. Pure numbers, or quantitative variety, is just that: number of
soldiers, number of weapon systems, or other factors used to determine the size of the
force. Qualitative variety is not concerned with aggregate totals, but with the number of
different types of soldiers, weapon systems, and missions of the force. This study shows
that a commander with the requisite qualitative variety can defeat an enemy with superior
quantitative variety One of the difficulties with this concept is that variety is hard to
quantify and measure.
4. A Conceptual Framework
Although variety is somewhat intangible, the framework developed in this study
reveals concrete ways to provide the commander with the necessary variety to dominate
the battlefield, through regulation, information, and variety catalysts. Regulation
concerns controlling the environmental factors that influence the system in order to reduce
the variety of actions the commander must control. For example, environmental
regulation could be a change to the National Military Strategy or Defense Planning
Guidance The U.S. could decide not to use military forces for disaster relief or
Operations Other Than War. Information assists the commander in obtaining Requisite
Variety by reducing the uncertainty of the system. Knowing where you are, where your
buddies are, and where the enemy is, facilitates proactive measures by the commander and
soldiers on the ground. Variety catalysts directly increase the number of options available
to the commander. These include changes in doctrine, training, organizations, leadership,
and materiel. The framework clearly distinguishes between quantitative variety catalysts
(numbers and force strengths), and qualitative variety catalysts (different types of COAs),
however, both types of catalysts can be used to increase the commander's variety. Each
of these has distinct advantages and disadvantages. Optimally, a combination of all three
alternatives should be utilized to achieve synergistic results.
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This study suggests that given the current budgetary constraints and the global
world environment, the Army should focus its short term material acquisitions on C^I and
mobility assets. By applying the conceptual framework to the concepts of Force XXI
operations, the researcher developed the Time-Information Differential. Increasing the
situational awareness and reducing the time it takes to act on the battlefield creates
advantageous conditions suited for initiative. Based on this concept the Army will gain
the most utility while at the same time minimizing its costs by prioritizing its short term
efforts on these assets. However, to achieve synergistic results, the Army should
concurrently research other types ofweapon systems using the framework as a guide.
This research also shows that the framework and concepts of Requisite Variety are
valid for other Services and DoD as a whole. The Army and other Services are
subsystems of DoD. This larger, or parent system, acts as the control mechanism to
defend our nation against the various threats that exist. Therefore, this parent system
exhibits the same characteristics as the model for the Army, and there is no reason to
suspect that the conceptual framework would not be even more applicable at this higher,
DoD level.
5. Force XXI AWE
The framework was examined by applying it to an AWE conducted by TRADOC.
The AWE validated many aspects of the Conceptual Framework for Providing Requisite
Variety. Overall, the General Officer Working Group recognized that without Requisite
Variety, the Force XXI Division could not conduct Decisive Operations. That is, they
could not totally dominate the battlefield without the necessary means to do so within the
control system. The lack of Requisite Variety in this exercise was primarily caused by two
factors. First the Force XXI Division did not have the "assured" capabilities required for
the operation. That is, they lacked sufficient qualitative variety. Second, the
environmental regulation imposed by higher headquarters limited the number of COAs
available to the Division.
The exercise also suggests that as the capabilities of future forces increase, the
forces will be called upon to take on more responsibility. Commanders at the tactical level
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will have to understand and execute operations in order to achieve strategic objectives.
This melding of levels of war increases the complexity of the system. It represents an
implosion of the series of concentric rectangles that represented the parent and subsystems
in our model, and places an even greater importance on the need for our forces to have
Requisite Variety.
Next, the exercise demonstrated that information, environmental regulation, and
variety catalysts are all valid ways to increase the commanders' options on the battlefield.
However, these methods to increase variety must be used correctly and in an integrated
fashion to achieve maximum results. Two prime examples illustrated 1 the exercise
involved environmental regulation and information. Environmental regulation in the
exercise decreased the friendly commander's options, and therefore, increased instead of
reduced the complexity of the system. The group of General Officers deemed this point as
so significant that one of their key findings was that higher headquarters must reduce the
amount of prescriptive tasks dictated to subordinate units. Information dominance was a
valued commodity that had to be planned for and efficiently utilized to be effective.
Finally, the exercise demonstrated the importance of qualitative variety. The
group devised many different ways to increase their variety. One significant method was
maximizing the Time-Information Differential which the author introduced in Chapter V.
The group made continual efforts to maintain information superiority, and utilized highly
mobile assets to decrease the time it takes to proactively influence the battle. In addition,
the group supplemented the dTI concept through the use of long-range, precision strike
munitions which further decreased the time to shape the battlespace.
This framework is very powerful. It provides an innovative way to determine
requirements using Requisite Variety as a basis. The people of the U.S. are looking for
ways to tighten the DoD budget, yet they still want a force that is capable of achieving a
quick, decisive victory. Given these conditions, Requisite Variety is a nascent
requirement. This framework takes Ashby's Law, a relatively simple but underutilized
theory, and directly applies it to the military. It shows that complex systems, such as
battles and campaigns, can be dominated by having the necessary variety and the
framework provides the guidelines for achieving this level of variety. Further, it provides
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a common vocabulary to explain weapon requirements and the concepts of Force XXI to
both Congress and the warfighters on the ground. It helps explain the question, "Why?"
Why is the Army spending millions of dollars on AWEs and high-tech equipment to
digitize the battlefield? Why is the Army developing conceptual doctrine that seems more
suitable for Luke Skywalker than Sergeant York? Requisite Variety is one of the answers
and this framework facilitates its analysis and discussion.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Incorporate Variety as a Factor
The most significant finding of this study is that variety should be a factor in
determining requirements for the future operational forces of the U.S. Army. We have
seen that the future forces of the U.S. Army face a great variety of threats in a global
environment with unprecedented complexities. Ashby's theory of Requisite Variety
reveals that in order to control such complex systems, the amount of variety in the control
mechanism has to be at least the same as in the system being controlled. In other words,
in order to win the battle, the different COAs available to the commander must be greater
than or equal to those available to his enemy. Clearly the Army recognizes the importance
of variety; for it has included the concept of versatility as a tenet of Army Operations in
the keystone doctrinal manual FM 100-5. But this manual's focus is on unit and individual
soldier skills, not overall requirements. It uses statements such as, "units must meet
diverse mission requirements" and "versatility requires competence in a variety of missions
and skills." Additionally, future warfighting concepts, such as those captured in
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, allude to the importance of variety. Despite its recognized
importance, the Army fails to use variety as a factor when determining requirements. The
Army should directly apply the theory of Requisite Variety in its requirements
determination process. TRADOC should make variety a factor in evaluating alternative
weapon systems and force structures. All stakeholders including ICTs, materiel
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developers, battle labs, and warfighters need to understand the concept of Requisite
Variety.
At the national level, the executive and legislative branches should use the
conceptual framework developed in this study to assist them in understanding the
complexity of the requirements placed on the Army. If the American public wants the
Army to continue to perform a variety of missions, Government officials should give the
Army the tools with which to achieve these objectives. If cost must be held as an
independent variable, then the framework gives Government officials the flexibility to
regulate the system, prioritize requirements, and then resource the Army accordingly.
2. Aggressively Pursue Intelligence on Future Threats
During the Cold War the U.S. had very robust intelligence efforts to gain and
interpret information about the former Soviet Union. However, as defense spending has
dwindled, so have these intelligence efforts. This study shows that the U.S. should
continue to pursue robust intelligence efforts focused on determining valid threats. Doing
so will reduce the uncertainty, variety, and complexity of the systems DoD is required to
control. Therefore, the Services may not require as much variety in their forces as they do
today facing a great variety of threats with unprecedented complexities.
3. Prioritization of Weapon Systems
Given current financial constraints, the Army's short term requirements efforts
should focus on C^I and mobility systems. Concurrently, long term efforts should focus
on parallel processes of prototyping action systems. These areas provide the most benefit
to cost ratio for building a bridge to the 21st Century. Information reduces the
uncertainty in the system, while mobility and situational awareness act as catalysts to
increase the variety of friendly forces. Modernization of action (weapon) systems can
further increase our variety. However, given the current financial health of the defense
environment and using cost as an independent variable, this option does not seem prudent
in the short term. With the quality of intelligence assets that exists, the Army can make
great strides by simply re-engineering the process of obtaining and distributing
102
information. This does not mean we should build all intelligence systems and no action
systems For then, we would be "putting all of our eggs in the same basket" and risk not
having the Requisite Variety to conduct Decisive Operations.
4. Continue the push for Joint Warfare
Using the capabilities of all the Services in Joint Warfare is excellent way to
provide Requisite Variety. The U.S. should continue to train and fight as a Joint team.
Efforts should be made to increase the connectivity of weapon systems and doctrine to
achieve synergistic results.
5. Higher Headquarters should reduce the amount of prescriptive tasks
to subordinate units.
This is an interesting finding that came from applying the conceptual framework to
the AWE. Prescriptive tasks from higher headquarters act as regulation which reduces the
variety of the subordinate commander. This constrains the intellectual development of
concepts of operation and the freedom to employ every tool at the commanders' disposal
for maneuver. Higher headquarters should focus on what the requirements are, not how
to perform them.
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What is the current process for Requirements Determination and
what pathologies with respect to resource allocation exist with this process?
Reference: Chapter II.
The Army's Requirements Determination process is based on the threat, identified
deficiencies, and opportunities for new capabilities. It begins with the TRADOC
commander's vision and holistic future warfighting concept. This concept is formed from
a wide variety of inputs, including the national security and military strategies, lessons
learned from recent operational experiences and future conflict scenarios, and future S&T
possibilities. Then a multidisciplinary ICT translates this concept into future capabilities
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and solutions. These capabilities are tested through a combination of live, constructive,
and virtual experiments. Feedback from these experiments is used to refine the ideas and
concepts, and eventually develop requirements. By design, the process is very flexible. It
accommodates spiral development and employs a variety of feedback mechanisms.
However, there are some pathologies that exist. Namely, the process does not directly
address the importance of variety in the composition of forces. It does not assess or
evaluate the need for having a variety of weapon systems. Perhaps more important in
today's environment of tight fiscal constraints, the process does not have the capability to
prioritize weapon systems with respect to variety.
2. What is the operational concept of land forces for the 21st Century
and how does it impact the structure of forces in the future?
Reference: Chapter III.
The Army validly makes the assumption that the future forces of the U.S. face a
great variety of threats in a global environment with unprecedented complexities. In order
to deal with this complex environment, the Army has outlined warfighting concepts that
emphasize knowledge-based operations: a shared common and timely perception of the
battlefield. These knowledge-based operations are characterized by multiple dimensions,
simultaneous attacks of precision fires that are distributed throughout the battlespace, and
integration with other Services and nations.
These concepts contribute to the foundation of requirements determination. They
must be clearly understood by all personnel involved in the process. The Army is looking
towards future capabilities, yet claims Force XXI operations are firmly grounded to the
principles of war. While this claim is arguably true, the researcher found that many
personnel do not understand these concepts and how they fit into future force
requirements. This research indicates that the Army needs a framework to properly
examine and integrate these future warfighting concepts with advanced technical
capabilities and determine future battlefield requirements.
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3. What is the theory of Requisite Variety?
Reference: Chapter IV.
The theory of Requisite Variety was discovered in the early 1950's by the British
cybertician, Ross Ashby. It indicates that in order to control a complex system the amount
of variety in the control mechanism must be greater than or equal to that in the system
itself.
4. What are the military applications of the theory of Requisite Variety
and how might it impact the determination of requirements and structuring
of forces in the future?
Reference: Chapters IV and V.
The theory of Requisite Variety has a direct application to military operations,
future doctrine development, and requirements determination. The act of engaging in war
and OOTW is complex and contains a great deal of uncertainty. In order to conduct
decisive operations, the different COAs available to the friendly commander must be
greater than or equal to that of his enemy. There are two types of variety: quantitative
and qualitative. The theory of Requisite Variety shows that a commander who possesses
enough qualitative variety can dominate the battle field even if he has inferior numbers
when compared to his enemy. Further, information can reduce the uncertainty of the
situation and assist in regulating the system.
5. Using the theory of Requisite Variety as a basis, how can a conceptual
framework be developed for innovating the requirements determination
process?
Reference: Chapter V, specifically Figure 5-1.
Although variety is somewhat intangible, the conceptual framework depicted in
Figure 5-1 shows that there are many concrete ways to provide the commander with the
necessary variety to dominate the battlefield. Environmental factors can regulate the
system and reduce the complexity, but these factors are out of the commander's
immediate control and make up part of a different system. The other ways to ensure
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requisite variety that are within the commander's control are: information, quantitative
variety catalysts (numbers), and qualitative variety catalysts (different types of COAs,
weapon systems, and soldiers). Each of these have distinct advantages and disadvantages.
Optimally, a combination of all three alternatives should be utilized in order to achieve
synergistic effects.
6. What impact would this framework have on Joint warfare and other
Services?
Reference: Chapter V, Paragraph D.
Although the framework was developed from an Army perspective, the
characteristics hold true for other Services. In fact the framework, given slight
modifications, can apply to any complex system. For example, Joint warfare is an
excellent example of a qualitative variety catalyst. The use of different weapon systems
and platforms provides the Joint Commander a great deal of variety. From this paradigm
it is clear that the Army and the other Services are subsystems of a larger, parent system.
7. What impact would variety have on funding and how can the Army
articulate this to Congress?
Reference: Chapter V.
The most significant finding of this study is that variety should be a factor in
determining requirements for the future operational forces of the U.S. Army. In the 21st
Century, the Army faces a great variety of threats in a global environment with
unprecedented complexities. The framework reveals that in order to dominate the
battlefield, commanders must have as many different options as the enemy. Therefore, if
the American public wishes to remain a dominant world leader, the nation must fund its
military forces so that commanders have the Requisite Variety to accomplish this mission.
This does not necessarily mean that defense funding needs to be increased to all-time
highs. Rather, the framework provides a vehicle to discuss the allocation of scarce
resources from a different paradigm. It indicates there are many ways to provide the
commander the necessary variety to dominate the battlefield. This study suggests that
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given the current budgetary constraints and the global world environment, the Army
should focus its short term material acquisitions on C^I and mobility assets. However, to
achieve synergistic results, the Army should concurrently research other types of weapon
systems using the framework as a guide.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1. Quantify the Factor of Variety
Investigate alternatives to model and quantify the factor of Requisite Variety. In
these times of downsizing, cost has become an important factor. Further research is
needed in this area. One angle that could be pursued is to run a series of exercises using
the variety of weapon systems as an independent variable. Based on the outcomes of
these experiments, a cost benefit analysis could be performed. This would be an attempt
to quantify the effectiveness of Requisite Variety.
2. Logistical Impact
Examine what impact Requisite Variety has on logistics in terms of life-cycle costs,
schedule, and performance. Determine the factors that contribute to successful integration
of a variety of weapon systems. Develop a list of specific logistic issues that must be
addressed by the Army to assist in obtaining Requisite Variety efficiently.
3. Variety Catalysts
Research different possibilities for variety catalysts. Explore across the domains of
doctrine, organizations, training, leadership, materiel, and soldiers. For example, can
improving the turnaround time or operational availability of a certain weapon system
increase the commander's quantitative variety? Determine which catalysts are the most
effective in increasing variety and compare this to which ones are the most cost efficient.
Develop a prioritized list of variety catalysts based on effectiveness and efficiency.
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4. Apply Requisite Variety to a Program Office
Explore how the conceptual framework for providing Requisite Variety can be
applied to a Weapon System Program. Determine what factors contribute to the
uncertainty and complexity of the program. Investigate how Program Managers can use
information and regulation to reduce the complexity of the program. Develop a list of
possible variety catalysts that are available to Program Managers to increase the Requisite
Variety in their control mechanism.
5. Modular Divisions
Examine the concept of modular organized divisions. This was an interesting
recommendation from the General Officer Working Group as a result of the AWE. An
initial analysis shows that this concept will increase the variety of the division. However,
at what cost? Will unit cohesion and morale decrease? Will standard operating
procedures have to be modified to accommodate all units? Discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of a modular organization and its utility for providing Requisite Variety.
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APPENDIX A. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AR Army Regulation
ASTMP Army Science and Technology Master Plan
ASTWG Army Science and Technology Working Group
AWE Advanced Warfighting Experiment
AWWG Advanced Warfighting Work Group
CBRS Capabilities Based Requirements Determination System
CI Commercial Item
C^I Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
COA Course of Action
CSS Combat Service Support
DCD Directorate of Combat Developments
DCDSD Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments
DCSOPS Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
DoD Department of Defense
DPG Defense Planning Guidance
dTI Time-Information Differential
EXFOR Experimental Force
FLOT Forward Line of Troops
FM Field Manual
FOC Future Operational Capability
FSB Forward Support Battalion







Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
MACOM Major Army Command
METT-T Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain, and Time Available











OCR Operational Capability Requirements
OOTW Operations Other Than War
OR Operational Research
ORD Operational Requirements Document




Science and Technology Objective
TRAC TRADOC Analysis Center
TRADOC Army Training and Doctrine Command
TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
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APPENDIX B. AWE ROAD TO WAR
The nation of Burgundy was established by the Allied Powers following World
War II (WWII) as a constitutional monarchy. The nation encompassed the original
country of Burgundy in the south, and an industrial region annexed from the country of
Saxony as reparations following WWII. The royal family was well established in pre-war
Burgundy, and was highly involved in the partisan effort during the war.
Nov 1984 - Sales ofBurgundy wine, the nation's chief export, decline for the fourth
straight year due to rising popularity of wine exports from America.
Licensed wineries have decreased 22% over the last 5 years.
Jan 1985 - Burgundy Ministry of Trade directs massive technological upgrade of the
industrial base. Publishes 10 year plan. Export tariffs on wine increased
25%. National capitol moved to Calais.
Nov 1992 - Liberal Industrial Party captures 40% of parliament. Promises increased
resources for industry. Urges closer ties with Saxony. Agrarian
Conservative Party vows any opposition to any initiative which further
hampers agricultural exports, and retains 45% of Parliament.
Mar 1993 - Rioting broke out in the rural towns of Cahors, Bourges, and Blois.
Government offices ransacked.
Apr 1993 - National Guard units form the north are dispatched to southern regions to
maintain order.
Oct 1994 - Queen Chablis calls for dissolution of Parliament. Royal Family leaves
Calais, returns to ancestral home in Paris. Christine Amanpour reports
from Paris that the local citizens are overwhelmingly in support of the
Agrarian Conservative faction.
Nov 1994 - Liberal Industrial Party wins 55% of popular vote. Agrarian Conservative
Party claims election fraud, stating that votes from southern regions were
not counted.
Feb 1995 - U.N. establishes 6 supply points east to facilitate distribution of food and
medical supplies.
Mar 1995 - Atrocities by both sides documented by U.N.
Ill
Mar 1995 - 6 motorized brigades of member nations sent to Burgundy to conduct
Peacemaking operations under U.N. control. 3 Safe Areas established for
each factions.
Apr 1995 - 3 members of royal family assassinated in Paris. Queen Chablis blames
Liberal Industrial Party leaders. National Guard units from both regions in
conflict. Saxony petitions U.N. for permission to enter Burgundy and
safeguard citizenry in north. Petition denied.
May 1995 - Popular consensus in U.N. member nations favors action to remedy
situation without alignment to any faction, or the commitment of ground
forces.
May 1995 - 6 Civilians killed in artillery raid in southern region. Pro-Conservative
forces retaliate in kind.
May 1995 - Air Strikes have resulted in loss of 13 aircraft in the last 2 months. Both
sides are emplacing artillery positions near hospitals and orphanages.
May 1995 - Fist Safe area falls to Liberal faction.
May 1995 - Westphalia issues policy statement calling for partitioning of Burgundy
along pre-WWII boundaries.
May 1995 - U.N. Resolution 422 requests Security Council intervention to conduct
Peace Enforcement operations and prevent widening ofwar in Burgundy.
May 1995 - Westphalia provides advisors to Saxony.
Jun 1995 - CJTF Atlanta established. NCA directs implementation ofACO Campaign
Plan STILL WATERS. "Enter Burgundy and conduct actions as required
to establish conditions for peace-building operations under U.N. auspices.
Jun 1995 - Secretary-General directs development of new air campaign. 3d U.N.
commander of forces resigns. States to world press that "...never in
history has dominance of the air achieved control of the ground." - cites air
campaigns of the Germans against the British, Allies against the Axis, and
Vietnam. States that peace will only be achieved by introduction of ground
forces and forcible disarming of factions.
Jun 1995 - Second Safe Area falls to Liberal faction.
Jun 1995 - U.N. Brigades abandon Safe Areas to concentrate on security of supply
distribution points.
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28 Jul 1995 - Saxony moves forces towards border with Burgundy citing concerns over
welfare of Saxony descendants in Burgundy.
020100 Jun 95 N Hour.
7Junl995- M Day.
18 Jun 1995 - Saxony mobilizes reserves.
19 Jun 1995 - NCA directs ACOM CONPLAN RAGING TORRENT. "Conduct
operations necessary to maintain the territorial integrity of the nation of
Burgundy."
21 Jun 1995 - C Day. 10th Corps departs CONUS.
28 Jun 1995 - Allied Atlantic Division (Multinational) closes in FAA vie Paris.
15 Jul 1995 - 2 MEF closes into Calais.
23 Jul 1995 - 10 Corps closes into FAAs vie Paris.
29 Jul 1995 - 2 Corps embarks at Beaumont Texas.
30 Jul 1995 - Unarmed U.N. observer team engaged by Saxony forces: 4 KIA.
4 Aug 1995 - Allied Atlantic Division fuel truck hits mine and is destroyed.
18 Aug 1995-2 Allied Atlantic Division helicopters on border trace flight engaged and
destroyed by Saxony forces.
20 Aug 1995 - 10th Corps patrol ambushed vie Saxony border: 6 KIA.
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